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RACE, MARRIAGE, AND THE LAW OF FREEDOM:
ALABAMA AND VIRGINIA, 1860s-1960s
PETER WALLENSTEIN*
INTRODUCTION
In 1966, one hundred years after Congress passed the Fourteenth
Amendment and sent it to the states for ratification,' Richard and
Mildred Loving took a case to the U.S. Supreme Court to challenge
their convictions for having violated Virginia's laws against interracial
marriage. In the months ahead, the nation's high court would face
squarely, for the first time, the question of whether laws like Virginia's
violated the Fourteenth Amendment. In June 1967, in a unanimous
decision, the Court struck down all laws that made the racial identity
of an American citizen a criterion for indictment and conviction for
the crime of contracting a marriage.2
The most private of relationships proved tightly entwined with
public policy in the years after the end of American slavery. Sexual
relations across racial lines-whether within marriage or outside it-
proved a topic of judicial interest into the 1960s for two reasons. First,
many American states enacted and long retained statutes restricting
such interracial relations, and second, some people sought to establish
and maintain such relations whatever the law. 3 Generalizing about
the racial attitudes and behavior of white southerners, Swedish soci-
ologist Gunnar Myrdal noted in the early 1940s that "the closer the
association of a type of interracial behavior is to sexual and social in-
* Associate Professor of History, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University.
B.A. 1966, Columbia University; Ph.D. 1973, Johns Hopkins University. For their comments on
this Essay, Professor Wallenstein wishes to thank Jane E. Dailey, Paul Finkelman, and David
Osher, Virginia Tech supported the research for this project through a Humanities Summer
Stipend in 1993 and a Curtis Fund Award in 1993-94.
1. ERic FONER, RECONSTRUCION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877, at
251-61 (1988).
2. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
3. For a very detailed history of the subject, see Byron C. Martyn, Racism in the United
States: A History of Anti-Miscegenation Legislation and Litigation (1979) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Southern California). Focusing on the twentieth century is Deborah
L. Kitchen, Interracial Marriage in the United States, 1900-1980 (1993) (unpublished Ph.D. dis-
sertation, University of Minnesota).
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tercourse on an equalitarian basis, the higher it ranks among the for-
bidden things."
'4
This Essay focuses on the most forbidden thing of all: marriage
between African Americans and European Americans. The Essay de-
tails the origins and application of laws against such marriages, and
tracks the history of challenges in the courts to those laws. Two states,
Virginia in the Upper South and Alabama in the Deep South, to-
gether illustrate how the law related to sex, marriage, and interracial
couples. Though the variations on a general theme are intriguing, the
two states differed little in the outlines of their legislative or judicial
histories on questions of miscegenation. Both states criminalized sex-
ual and marital relations of an interracial nature. In both states, any
number of cases developed at the local level, as the courts dealt with
indictments for violating the antimiscegenation laws. At the appellate
level some defendants brought appeals on constitutional or other
grounds. The legal environment in each state was shaped by a deci-
sion from the other state.
Four cases, two from Alabama and two from Virginia, went to the
U.S. Supreme Court. In 1883, Pace v. Alabama supplied a major pre-
cedent in favor of the constitutionality of antimiscegenation statutes;5
Virginia relied on Pace into the 1960s to justify its own antimiscegena-
tion laws. In two cases in the 1950s, Jackson v. Alabama6 and Naim v.
Virginia,7 the Court skirted the issue and left Pace intact. In 1967, in
Loving v. Virginia, the Supreme Court finally reversed Pace and estab-
lished a new law of race and marriage throughout the nation. Only in
the 1960s, a full century after Emancipation, did the Supreme Court
declare statutes against interracial marriage unconstitutional. Only
then did the law of slavery and racism defer at last to the law of free-
dom and racial equality.
The law that the Lovings challenged in the 1960s had its origins in
the seventeenth century. In Virginia, slavery and antimiscegenation
legislation developed together. In Alabama, by contrast, laws restrict-
ing interracial marriage originated only in the 1850s. In both states,
such laws reached their fullest development in the years between 1865
and 1883, that is, in the generation after the Civil War and Emancipa-
tion. Moreover, in both states the legal definitions of white and non-
4. GUNNAR MYRDAL ET AL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MOD-
ERN DEMOCRACY 61 (1944).
5. Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583, 585 (1883).
6. 348 U.S. 888 (1954).
7. 350 U.S. 891 (1955); 350 U.S. 985 (1956).
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white shifted in the early twentieth century, such that residents with
any discernible African ancestry were classified as nonwhite (some-
thing not the case in the nineteenth century).
When the Lovings married each other in 1958, no constitutional
challenge to antimiscegenation laws had succeeded in any federal
court. The American system of marital Apartheid no longer held
sway in many states outside the former Confederacy, but in the South
it showed no promise of relinquishing its control. That system had its
origins, at least in Virginia, as far back as the 1690s. It had grown
more powerful as slavery had. It had continued to grow more power-
ful into the 1920s and 1930s. As late as the 1950s, efforts to challenge
the system in state and federal courts alike in both Alabama and Vir-
ginia had come to naught. Yet, the Lovings prevailed in their chal-
lenge. This Essay tells the history of the system they challenged and
outlines the story of that challenge and its aftermath.
I. RACE, MARRIAGE, AND THE LAW: ALABAMA BEFORE
EMANCIPATION AND RECONSTRUCTION
Interracial marriages occurred with some frequency in pre-Civil
War Alabama. Few marriages took place between whites and full-
blooded African Americans, but a number of mixed-race women mar-
ried white men, and a similar number of white women married mixed-
race men.8
At no time before Reconstruction did Alabama outlaw such mar-
riages, either by imposing criminal sanctions against them or by de-
claring them null and void. It was not until 1852 that the Alabama
legislature acted to place any impediment to interracial marriages.
Before then, Alabama law authorized certain officials to "solemnize
the rites of matrimony between any free persons," with restrictions
only on age and kinship.9 After 1852, the law approved marriages
"between white persons, or between free persons of color," but not
between a member of one of those two groups and a member of the
other. The new law declared it a misdemeanor for a minister to per-
8. Gary B. Mills, Miscegenation and the Free Negro in Antebellum 'Anglo' Alabama: A
Reexamination of Southern Race Relations, 68 J. AM. HIST. 16-34 (1981).
9. HARRY TOULMIN, A DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF ALABAMA 576-79 (1823);
Mills, supra note 8, at 18 n.10 (quoting JOHN G. AIKEN, A DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF THE STATE
OF ALABAMA: CONTAINING ALL THE STATUTES OF A PUBLIC AND GENERAL NATURE, IN




form a marriage ceremony "when one of the parties is a negro and the
other a white person .. .
But who was a "negro"? In 1852, Alabama law specified that the
term "negro" should be understood to include "mulatto," which it de-
fined as anyone at least one-eighth black. 1 The urge to define "mu-
latto" can be traced directly to the Alabama Supreme Court's 1850
decision in Thurman v. State.12 Thurman, a "free mulatto," had been
convicted for the rape of a white woman. For such a conviction of a
"slave, free negro, or mulatto," the law required that the perpetrator
"suffer death."'1 3 Thurman, claiming to be the son of a white woman
and a mixed-race man, challenged his conviction under this law. The
court ruled that he could be clearly understood to be a "mulatto" only
if he were half black and half white (the child of one white parent and
one black), and the legislature had been insufficiently clear that it
meant to cast a wider net.
If the statute against mulattoes is by construction to include quad-
roons, then where are we to stop? If we take the first step by con-
struction, are we not bound to pursue the line of descendants, so
long as there is a drop of negro blood remaining? If not, the point
where we should stop can only be ascertained by judicial discretion.
This discretion belongs to the Legislature.' 4
Lawmakers hastened to adopt a definition that would include qua-
droons. Their twentieth century successors would adopt, instead, a
definition that the court had pointed toward and rejected, regarding
"pursu[ing] the line of descendants, so long as there is a drop of negro
blood remaining.' 15
II. POWER, RACE, AND RECONSTRUCTION: THE CIVIL RIGHTS
ACT OF 1866 AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
In the first session after the Civil War, the Alabama legislature-
like its counterparts in Virginia and the other southern states-en-
10. ALA. CODE § 1956 (1852).
11. Adopting a definition that Virginia had originated in 1705-and had relaxed in 1785 (on
the eighteenth-century Virginia laws, see infra discussion Part V)-the Alabama Code of 1852
stated: "The term 'negro' within the meaning of this code includes mulatto. The term 'mulatto,'
or 'person of color,' within the meaning of this code, is a person of mixed blood, descended on
the part of the father or mother, from negro ancestors, to the third generation inclusive, though
one ancestor of each generation may have been a white person." ALA. CODE § 4 (1852).
12. Thurman v. State, 18 Ala. 276, 278 (1850).
13. Id. Regarding the death penalty for nonwhite men convicted of raping white women,
see Peter W. Bardaglio, Rape and the Law in the Old South. 'Calculated to Excite Indignation in
Every Heart', 60 J. S. HIST. 749 (1994).
14. Thurman, 18 Ala. at 279.
15. See infra discussion Part VIII.
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acted a new Black Code to accommodate the end of slavery. Among
the new provisions, as instructed by the Constitutional Convention
that met in late 1865, was a statute that outlawed interracial marriage.
The Alabama Constitution of 1865 directed the legislature to make
interracial marriages between whites and people of African ancestry
"null and void ab initio, and mak[e] the parties to any such marriage
subject to criminal prosecutions."'16 The legislature established a pen-
alty of two to seven years imprisonment for both members of any in-
terracial couple-a white and "any negro, or the descendant of any
negro, to the third generation inclusive"-who "intermarry, or live in
adultery or fornication with each other .... " The law also established
penalties for any probate judge who knowingly issued a marriage li-
cense to an interracial couple and for any justice of the peace or minis-
ter of the gospel who performed a marriage ceremony for such a
couple. 17 Behavior that had been previously left up to individuals
now became a question of criminal law. In this sense, race had more
power to govern private relationships between free people in Ala-
bama after Emancipation than before. 18
Throughout the years of Reconstruction and beyond, the Ala-
bama courts ruled on various miscegenation cases. The fundamental
right of individual citizens to marry, to live together, and to remain
out of prison for doing so depended on how the courts ruled. What
the law was, whether it was constitutional, and how it affected various
individual relationships were questions that generated considerable
confusion between the late 1860s and the late 1870s. By the 1880s,
there was much less room for question. The rules had hardened, and
they would remain frozen in their new pattern until the 1960s. But in
the meantime, the courts had to respond to sharp changes in the polit-
ical, legal, and constitutional environment, and they had to determine
16. ALA. CONST. of 1865, art. IV, § 31.
17. ALA. CODE § 3602 (1867). For evidence relating to interracial sex, marriage, and the
law in early post-Civil War Alabama, see PETER KOLCHIN, FIRST FREEDOM: THE RESPONSES OF
ALABAMA'S BLACKS TO EMANCIPATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 61-62 (1972). For the mislead-
ing statement that, in the aftermath of the 1865 Alabama convention, -[m]arriages between
whites and blacks remained prohibited," see John B. Myers, The Freedman and the Law in Post-
Bellum Alabama, 1865-1867, 23 ALA. L. REV. 59 (1970).
18. Joel Williamsom observed that "[it is a tremendous irony that the emancipation of
Negroes entailed the emancipation of racism. It had been black versus white within the bounds
of slavery before; now there were no bounds." JOEL WILLIAMSON, NEW PEOPLE: MISCEGENA-
TION AND MULATTOES IN THE UNITED STATES 78 (1980). For elaboration on this point, see
MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH-CEN-
TURY AMERICA 126-40 (1985); and Martha E. Hodes, Sex Across the Color Line: White Women




how the law applied in various situations. In particular, the Four-
teenth Amendment, ratified in 1868, led to questions of whether an-
timiscegenation statutes had come under the ban.
Alabama, like the other states of the former Confederacy, exper-
ienced enormous political discontinuity after the Civil War. Emanci-
pation initiated great changes in social relations and the law, but
Reconstruction, as it unfolded, brought further change. At first, an
all-white electorate continued to select public officials. Thus, only
whites voted in the elections to the Alabama Constitutional Conven-
tion of 1865, and only whites participated in the elections to the state
legislature that followed. 19 When the Alabama legislature, like that of
each of its sister states, enacted a Black Code that struck most Repub-
licans in Congress as entirely too restrictive, Congress enacted the
Civil Rights Act of 1866. Then, to put the act beyond the reach of a
potentially hostile subsequent Congress and ensure that the courts
would not declare it unconstitutional, Congress passed the Fourteenth
Amendment declaring African Americans citizens and guaranteeing
them equal protection of the laws.
20
When Alabama-together with Virginia and all but one of the
other states that had comprised the Confederacy-rejected the Four-
teenth Amendment, Congress moved in 1867 to establish new condi-
tions that southern states had to meet before their representatives
could take their seats in the House and Senate. While President An-
drew Johnson required in 1865 that each former Confederate state call
a Constitutional Convention and ratify the Thirteenth Amendment
outlawing slavery, Congress required in 1867 that each of the ten
states that had rejected the Fourteenth Amendment call a new con-
vention, whose delegates would be chosen by a biracial electorate.
Those delegates had to write new constitutions that enfranchised
black men; and those states had to ratify the Fourteenth Amendment.
Only then, in the view of Congressional Republicans, would it be safe
to give the southern states back their seats in the House and Senate;
and only then might it be safe to leave black southerners in the hands
of southern state governments. Black southerners would have polit-
ical rights and could thus represent their interests in state politics; they
would presumably vote Republican and thus offset the votes of their
white neighbors in Congressional and Presidential elections; and, to
19. WALTER L. FLEMING, CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA 351-52, 372-73
(1905).
20. FONER, supra note 1, at 176-260.
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protect their rights in the courts, they could rely on the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.21 In Alabama, Republi-
cans controlled the Constitutional Convention that met in 1867 and
the state legislature and governorship that were elected the next year
under it. Republican control proved short-lived. By 1874, Democrats
had retrieved control, and they retained it into the late twentieth
century.2
2
III. RACE, SEX, AND THE COURTS IN ALABAMA, 1868-1877
Political change during Reconstruction related directly to changes
in personnel on the Alabama Supreme Court. The court always spoke
with one voice in miscegenation cases, and personnel changes fully
accounted for the discontinuity that the court displayed in its decisions
on such matters. Under the Constitution of 1868, the voters elected
three state supreme court judges to six-year terms. Beginning in 1869,
three white Alabama Republicans sat on the bench. After the 1874
elections, three Democrats did.2
3
The Lee County grand jury indicted Susan Bishop, a white wo-
man, and Thornton Ellis, described as "descended of negro ances-
tors," for violating Alabama's laws governing sexual relations.24
Under section 3598 of the Alabama Code of 1867, people convicted of
living "together in adultery, or fornication," were "to be fined not less
than one hundred dollars," and they could "also be imprisoned in the
county jail, or sentenced to hard labor for the county, for not more
than six months."25 A second conviction "with the same person" sub-
21. Id. at 260-79.
22. THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SouTHERN HISTORY 24-25, 30 (David C. Roller & Robert W.
lwyman eds., 1979).
23. ALA. CONST. of 1868, art. VI, §§ 11-12; SARAH W. WIGGINS, THE SCALAWAG IN ALA-
BAMA POLITICS, 1865-1881, at passim (1977). Thus, before and after the interlude that followed
the 1868 elections, the men who sat on the Alabama Supreme Court were-in postwar terms-
Democrats, whatever their prewar affiliations had been, in much the way that it could be said
about Justice Saffold that, "Before the War of Secession he was a Democrat, after the war a
Republican." For sketches of Thomas Minott Peters and Benjamin Franklin Saffold, the two
associate justices of the Republican era on the court (but not E. Wolsey Peck, the chief justice),
see 4 HISTORY OF ALABAMA AND DICTIONARY OF ALABAMA BIOGRAPHY [hereinafter HISTORY
OF ALABAMA] 1349, 1486, 1628-29 (Thomas M. Owen ed., 1921); 3 HISTORY OF ALABAMA 214,
951.
24. Ellis v. State, 42 Ala. 525 (1868). Confederate casualties reduced the odds that white
women could find white men for partners in postwar Alabama. In 1860, men comprised 51
percent of all white Alabama residents in their twenties and 52 percent of those in-their thirties.
2 UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, THE VITAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES 620 (1872)
(from the original returns of the ninth census). In 1870, by contrast, white men in Alabama
between the ages of 21 and 44 were in short supply; if fact, among whites between the ages of 25
and 34 and between 40 and 44, men comprised only 43 percent. Id. at 612-14.
25. ALA. CODE § 3598 (1867).
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jected the offender to a minimum fine of $300 and a maximum impris-
onment of twelve months; a third (or subsequent) conviction, again
"with the same person," carried a mandatory sentence of two years
either in the penitentiary or at hard labor for the county. Section 3598
covered same- race offenses.26 Section 3602 of the Code mandated
imprisonment, for a term of two to seven years each, of a white person
and a "descendant of any negro, to the third generation," if they "in-
termarry or live in adultery or fornication with each other. '27 A jury
found Bishop and Ellis guilty of violating section 3602-and imposed
a $100 fine on each of them, as though they had been convicted under
section 3598.28
They appealed their convictions. The Alabama Supreme Court
upheld the conviction but reversed the penalty. The court expressed
the notion that the trial judge had probably believed section 3602 vio-
lated the Civil Rights Act of 1866, and it rejected that premise. The
federal law, Chief Justice A. J. Walker wrote, "does not prohibit the
making of race and color a constituent of an offense, provided it does
not lead to a discrimination in punishment. ' 29 As for section 3602, it
"creates an offense, of which a participation by persons of different
race is an element. To constitute the offense, there must be not only
criminal intercourse, but it must be by persons of different race."'30
Walker argued that, because "[a]dultery between persons of different
races is the same crime as to white persons and negroes, and subject to
the same punishment," the Alabama statute did not contravene the
Civil Rights Act.31
Thus, the state supreme court upheld the Alabama law and sus-
tained the convictions, but it reversed the sentences and remanded the
case. What Thornton Ellis and Susan Bishop each gained from their
appeal was at least two years imprisonment rather than a fine. Ellis
and Bishop would have fared better if they had not appealed their
convictions. They might have fared still better if their case had come
to the Alabama Supreme Court on appeal just one term later. The
June term in 1868 was the last one before a new court was elected.
During that term, the two associate justices had served since the be-
ginning of 1866,32 and Chief Justice A. J. Walker had served on the
26. Id.
27. ALA. CODE § 3602 (1867).
28. Ellis, 42 Ala. at 526.
29. lId
30. Id.
31. Id. at 527.
32. See 39 Ala. v (1868); 42 Ala. iii (1870).
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court since 185633 and as chief justice since 1859.34 The new Republi-
can court began its work in 1869. 35 By that time, too, the Fourteenth
Amendment had been ratified.
The next miscegenation case to reach the Alabama Supreme
Court developed in 1872 after Justice of the Peace Burns was indicted
for having presided in Mobile over a wedding of an interracial couple.
When Burns appealed his conviction, Justice Benjamin F. Saffold
spoke for a court that viewed the miscegenation laws in a very differ-
ent light than the court four years earlier. The court now found that
section 3602 violated both the state and federal constitutions.36
"Marriage is a civil contract," Justice Saffold wrote.
The same right to make a contract as is enjoyed by white citizens,
means the right to make any contract which a white citizen may
make. The law intended to destroy the distinctions of race and
color in respect to the rights secured by it. It did not aim to create
merely an equality of the races in reference to each other. If so,
laws prohibiting the races from suing each other, giving evidence for
or against, or dealing with one another, would be permissible. 37
The Republican judge relied on the U.S. Supreme Court's 1857 Dred
Scott decision to bolster his interpretation of the law of freedom as it
contrasted with the law of slavery. He noted that Chief Justice Roger
B. Taney had stressed state laws banning marriage between blacks and
whites to support the conclusion that blacks were not citizens.38 As
the Alabama judge stated, "an inhabitant of a country, proscribed by
its laws, approaches equality with the more favored population in pro-
portion as the proscription is removed. ;39 He applied that notion to
the statute at hand:
Dred Scott was not allowed to sue a citizen because he was not him-
self a citizen. One of the rights conferred by citizenship, therefore,
is that of suing any other citizen. The civil rights bill now confers
this right upon the negro in express terms, as also the right to make
and enforce contracts, amongst which is that of marriage with any
citizen capable of entering into that relation.4°
Whatever the congressional authority to pass the Civil Rights Act in
1866, the Fourteenth Amendment enshrined "its cardinal principle" in
33. See 28 Ala. iii (1856).
34. See 33 Ala. v (1859).
35. See 43 Ala. v (1870).
36. Burns v. State, 48 Ala. 195, 198-99 (1872).
37. Itt at 197.
38. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 408 (1857).
39. Burns, 48 Ala. at 197.
40. Id. at 198.
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the federal constitution.41 The second section of Article One of the
Alabama constitution, Justice Saffold continued, had "the same ef-
fect."' 42 Mr. Burns was ordered freed.
Between 1868 and 1872, the Alabama Supreme Court reversed
direction on the state's miscegenation laws; it did so again in the years
that followed. By 1875, the Republican interlude of Reconstruction
had ended in Alabama, and the state supreme court was again under
the control of Democrats. In a series of cases, between 1875 and 1878,
the court perfected a new interpretation of the law of freedom. The
new interpretation, much more restrictive than the rule in Burns, en-
dured for nearly another hundred years.
The cases that rose to Alabama's highest court-no doubt the tip
of the iceberg-demonstrated that some citizens of Alabama crossed
racial boundaries to find marriage partners. These cases also reflected
the uncertain legal environment for such inclinations in the years after-
Emancipation.
In the Barbour Circuit Court, a white man named Ford and a
black woman were tried, under section 3602, on the felony charge of
"living together in adultery or fornication." They challenged the con-
stitutionality of that statute, and they pleaded not guilty. Convicted,
they were sentenced to at least two years' imprisonment. They ap-
pealed, and the Alabama Supreme Court heard their case in the June
term of 1875. Their lawyer, relying on the decision in Burns v. State,
argued that "[tihe legislature had no power to make an act[,] which
when committed by persons of the same race is only a misdemeanor, a
felony when committed by persons of different races. ' 43 John W. A.
Sanford, the Alabama attorney general in 1875-as he had been in
1868 and 1872," when he argued the state's side in the Ellis and
Burns cases-harkened back to Ellis v. State. He insisted that section
3602 contravened neither the state nor the federal constitutions.
Moreover, relying on the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in The
Slaughter-House Cases,45 he argued that "[e]very State has the right to
41. 1l
42. ld. Thus, Justice Saffold also introduced state constitutional grounds for invalidating
the Alabama statute, for "all persons resident in this State, born in the United States, or natural-
ized, . . . are hereby declared citizens of the State of Alabama, possessing equal civil and political
rights and public privileges." ALA. CONST. of 1868, art. I, § 2.
43. Ford v. State, 53 Ala. 150, 151 (1875).
44. Described as a "States Rights Democrat of the strictest sect," John William Augustine
Sanford, Jr., served as attorney general from 1865 through 1868, when he was displaced in Con-
gressional Reconstruction. He was elected in 1870 to a two-year term, and he ran successfully
again in 1874 and 1876. 4 HISTORY OF ALABAMA, supra note 23, at 1500.
45. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wal.) 36 (1873).
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regulate its domestic affairs, and to adopt a domestic policy most con-
ducive to the interest and welfare of its people. '46 As far as the deci-
sion in Bums v. State was concerned, he declared that it "should be
overruled." 47
This time the attorney general won a partial victory. In a per
curiam decision, the court stated that "[o]n the question involved in
this case, we can add nothing to the thorough discussion it received"
in the Ellis decision. 48 Yet, the court professed to see no "conflict"
between Ellis and Bums.
The latter case involved only the validity of the statute prohibiting
marriage between whites and blacks. The validity of the statute
prohibiting such persons from living in adultery was not involved.
Marriage may be a natural and civil right, pertaining to all persons.
Living in adultery is offensive to all laws human and divine, and
human laws must impose punishments adequate to the enormity of
the offence and its insult to public decency.49
The court spoke in its decision in Ford v. State as if the only ques-
tion were whether "adultery or fornication" should be a criminal of-
fense. It chose to ignore the racial component. It displayed no effort
to directly address the difference between a misdemeanor offence,
with a $100 fine, and a felony conviction that carried at least two
years' imprisonment. By implication, the court ruled that "the enor-
mity of the offence" was greater if the adulterous partners were of
different races than if they were of the same race.50
In two cases in the December 1877 term, the court completed the
counterrevolution that it had begun two years before.51 Like Ellis, but
unlike Ford, each involved the marriage of a black man and a white
woman. Having chosen to distinguish between a statutory ban on in-
terracial marriage (which had been struck down in Burns) and a simi-
lar ban on interracial adultery or fornication (which it had upheld in
Ford), the court now abandoned the distinction and upheld the
statutes.
Aaron Green married Julia Atkinson in Butler County on July
13, 1876. They were soon indicted for violating section 4189 of the
revised Alabama code of 1876, which, like its predecessor section
3602, banned interracial marriages and established greater penalties





51. Green v. State, 58 Ala. 190 (1878); Hoover v. State, 59 Ala. 57 (1878).
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for fornication and adultery in cases of interracial couples than when
both partners were of the same race.52 Julia Green's case reached the
Alabama Supreme Court.5 3
Green pleaded not guilty to the charge, but she did not dispute
the facts. Judge John K. Henry instructed the jury that "if they be-
lieved the evidence, they must find the defendant guilty. '5 4 Thus, the
jury convicted her, and Judge Henry sentenced her to two years in the
penitentiary.5 5 Citing the Burns decision, she appealed. Attorney
General Sanford urged that Bums be overturned, as he had urged two
years earlier in Ford. He relied again on the Alabama decision in El-
lis, together with an Indiana decision, State v. Gibson, which deter-
mined that the Fourteenth Amendment did not abrogate a statute
making it a felony-with penalties of one to ten years in prison and a
fine of $1,000 to $5,000-for any white person and anyone at least
one-eighth black to marry each other.5 6
Justice Amos R. Manning spoke for the court in a thoroughgoing
rejection of the decision made by "our immediate predecessors" in
Burns. He noted that at the time that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was
passed, many northern states had antimiscegenation laws on the
books, and he declared that no mention of such laws had been made
in Congressional debates. Returning to the court's line of argument in
Ellis, he insisted that the Alabama law "no more tolerates" interracial
marriage on the part of a "white person" than of a "negro or mu-
latto"; "each of them is punishable for the offense prohibited, in pre-
cisely the same manner and to the same extent. There is no
discrimination made in favor of the white person, either in the capac-
ity to enter into such a relation, or in the penalty. '57
Going farther, the court insisted that "the subject should be re-
garded with a broader view. Is marriage," Justice Manning de-
manded, "nothing more than a civil contract?" 58 No, it was much
more than that. He cited a Kentucky decision, for example, that
stated that "marriage, the most elementary and useful" of all social
relations,
is regulated and controlled by the sovereign power of the state, and
can not, like mere contracts, be dissolved by the mutual consent only




56. State v. Gibson, 36 Ind. 389, 390 (1871).
57. Green, 58 Ala. at 192.
58. Id. at 193.
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of the contracting parties, but may be abrogated by the sovereign
will, either with, or without, the consent of both parties, whenever
the public good, or justice to both, or either of the parties, will be
thereby subserved. 59
Marriages created "homes," wrote Justice Manning, and homes served
as "the nurseries of States." 60
Who can estimate the evil of introducing into their most intimate
relations, elements so heterogeneous that they must naturally cause
discord, shame, disruption of family circles and estrangement of kin-
dred? While with their interior administration, the State should in-
terfere but little, it is obviously of the highest public concern that it
should, by general laws adapted to the state of things around them,
guard them against disturbances from without.
61
The judge proceeded to discuss "the state of things" to which
such laws must be adapted. He conceded that "[i]t depends very
much, of course, upon the relative proportions and condition of the
two races in any State, whether legislation of the kind in question is
necessary there or not."62 He did not need to remind anyone in Ala-
bama that, with regard to "relative proportions," people in that state
who had no African ancestors (or at least none within recent genera-
tions) comprised only a small majority (52 percent) of all residents.63
As to "condition," virtually all of the black citizens of Alabama had
only recently been slaves. The implication, perhaps not at all in-
tended, was that as slavery receded into the past, or as the black per-
centage of Alabama residents declined, or both, the need for such
legislation might diminish.
In Alabama in the 1870s, however, and (the court assumed) virtu-
ally everywhere else in the nation at that time, the "conviction" pre-
vailed that
the law should absolutely frustrate and prevent the growth of any
desire or idea of such an alliance [as an interracial marriage] ... by
making marriage between the two races, legally impossible, and se-
verely punishing those who perform, and those who, with intent to
be married, go through the ceremonies thereof. Manifestly, it is for
the peace and happiness of the black race, as well as of the white,
that such laws should exist. And surely there can not be any tyr-
anny or injustice in requiring both alike, to form this union with
those of their own race only, whom God hath joined together by
59. Green, 58 Ala. at 193 (quoting Maguire v. Maguire, 37 Ky. (7 Dana) 181, 184 (1838)
(emphasis in original)).
60. Green, 58 Ala. at 194.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 194-95.
63. TuE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SouTimmN HIsToRY, supra note 22, at 31.
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indelible peculiarities, which declare that He has made the two
races distinct. 64
Logic and law alike, Justice Manning contended, dictated that the
court uphold the constitutionality of the Alabama laws. He cited vari-
ous court decisions elsewhere. 65 And in view of his social commen-
tary, he demanded,
How, then, can it be maintained that the States of this Union, in
adopting amendments which make no allusion to such intermar-
riages, intended to deprive themselves of the important power of
regulating matters of so great consequence and delicacy within their
own borders for themselves, as it always was their undoubted right
to do.6
6
To the contrary, the court declared that the Reconstruction amend-
ments to the U.S. Constitution were "designed to secure to citizens,
without distinction of race, rights of a civil or political kind only-not
such as are merely social, much less those of a purely domestic na-
ture. ' 67 Thus, "[n]o amendment to the Constitution, nor any enact-
ment thereby authorized, is in any degree infringed by the
enforcement of the section of the Code, under which the appellant in
this cause was convicted and sentenced." 68
Justice Manning was clear in his conclusion. "In performance of
our duty, the judgment of the circuit court must be affirmed. '' 69 Yet,
the court did not see any particular need for the white woman in this
case, "Julia Atkinson alias Green," to serve time in prison. She might
well have been misled as to the legal force of the Alabama miscegena-
tion laws. The object was that they be upheld. "In view of the deci-
sion made by our predecessors" in the Burns case, "which is hereby
overruled, we trust that the Executive of this State will find just rea-
sons in this case, why appellant should receive a pardon. ' 70
Later that term, the court took an additional step in detailing the
law of freedom as it applied to interracial sex and marriage. Robert
Hoover, a black man, had married Betsey Litsey, a white woman, on
March 6, 1875, in Talladega County. The next year the grand jury
indicted them for living together in "adultery or fornication." She had
not been tried, but he had been. Pointing to his marriage, Hoover had
64. Green, 58 Ala. at 195.
65. State v. Gibson, 36 Ind. 389 (1871); State v. Ross, 76 N.C. 224 (1877); State v. Kennedy,
76 N.C. 232 (1877).
66. Green, 58 Ala. at 195.
67. Id. at 196.
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pled not guilty. Evidence showed that, during the year 1876, the
couple had "lived together openly" in "a house containing only one
room" in the Talladega area and that "[t]hey represented themselves
to be married."'71 The state placed in evidence a marriage license
signed by George P. Plowman, judge of probate, with a note affixed
from a minister, John Livingston, that he had performed the wedding
ceremony the same day. So how was it that the state represented the
couple to be living in a sexual relationship outside marriage?
Hoover sought to introduce evidence that before the marriage
license had ever been issued, he had asked Judge Plowman for assur-
ance that it was lawful for the two to be married. Advising Hoover
that it was legal, Judge Plowman had informed him that the Alabama
"Supreme Court had decided the law forbidding such marriages to be
unconstitutional. ' 72 The state objected to the introduction of such ev-
idence, and the trial judge, John Henderson, sustained the objection.
After both sides presented their cases, Judge Henderson, refusing
the instructions that Hoover wanted, told the jury
that the marriage shown in this case was forbidden by law, is a nul-
lity, and is no protection to the parties who are guilty as charged in
the indictment, if the evidence shows, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that Hoover is a negro man and Litsey a white woman, and that
they have been cohabiting as husband and wife .... 73
The jury saw no reasonable doubt.
When the case came to the Alabama Supreme Court, the state
attorney general, the everlasting Mr. Sanford, cited the recent Green
decision to argue that the lower court should be sustained. By con-
trast, Hoover's attorney argued that "[tihere never was a statute of
Alabama forbidding marriage between whites and negroes, and de-
claring it to be void ab initio .. . . 74 Rather, he cited section 4189,
which supplied a criminal sanction for such marriages. He argued fur-
ther that Hoover could not be criminally liable, for his marriage had
occurred "nearly three years after" the Burns decision, which had, on
constitutional grounds, negated the Alabama statute against interra-
cial marriage. Moreover, his marriage had taken place before the
court's rulings in both Ford and Green.75 The first argument could not
have prevented Hoover's indictment, trial, and conviction, but it
might have subjected him to a charge of violating the law against his
71. Hoover v. State, 59 Ala. 57, 58 (1878).
72. Id.





marriage rather than the one on adultery. The second argument
should have relieved Hoover of his conviction, but, in view of the de-
cision in Green, it offered little hope of the couple's continuing to live
together in Alabama without prosecution.
Justice George Washington Stone spoke for the court in rejecting
Hoover's contentions and in upholding the lower court on every
count. The attorney general had his way once again. The court read
the decision in Green as having declared interracial marriages "void."
Since the Hoovers' marriage was absolutely void, the Hoovers "must
be treated as unmarried persons, and their sexual cohabitation as for-
nication within the statute. ' 76 As the trial judge had instructed the
jury, the Hoovers' wedding ceremony offered "no protection" against
the charge of living together without benefit of marriage. Nor had the
circuit court erred "in refusing to receive testimony that, before the
alleged marriage, the probate judge counselled the defendant it was
lawful for him to marry a white woman. ' 77 Ignorance of the law is no
excuse, the court insisted, "and the former erroneous ruling of this
court furnishes no excuse which we can recognize. ' 78 In fact, the stat-
ute at issue, though outlawed in the Burns decision, had been incorpo-
rated verbatim when Alabama revised its Code in 1876. Finally, as to
Hoover's contention that, "to constitute a crime, there must be both
an act and an intent," the court proved equally unyielding.79 Though
agreeing with the point, it saw no application in the case at hand.
But, in such a case as this, it is enough if the act be knowingly and
intentionally committed. The law makes the act the offence, and
does not go farther, and require proof that the offenders intended,
by the prohibited act, to violate the law. The act being intentionally
done, the criminality necessarily follows.80
Having come down so uncompromisingly against Hoover, the
court nonetheless saw a place for mercy, even if it could not offer such
itself.
There is no error in the record, but we consider this a case for exec-
utive clemency, on condition there be given satisfactory assurance
of a discontinuance of this very gross offence against morals and
decorum. Should the crime be repeated or continued, the law
should lay a heavy restraining hand on the offenders.81
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Whatever the fate of Hoover and Litsey, the Alabama Supreme Court
had made its views entirely clear on the constitutionality, the propri-
ety, and even the urgent necessity of that state's antimiscegenation
laws.
Alabama Attorney General John W. A. Sanford lost one, but
only one, of all these cases. In every case that reached the state's high
court in the post Civil War years, the trial court had convicted the
defendant for violating some provision of the antimiscegenation stat-
utes. In the only case in which the state supreme court overturned the
lower court conviction, a white justice of the peace, named Burns, got
off after presiding at the wedding of an interracial couple.
The best that can be said about the other cases is that authorities
did not seek to hit defendants with the greatest possible penalties. To
the contrary, defendants seem to have been routinely sentenced to
two years' loss of liberty, rather than a period as great as seven years.
In the case of Thornton Ellis and Susan Bishop, the couple had been
ordered to forfeit only a fine of $100 each, which, though no small
amount to be sure, entailed a loss of property rather than liberty and
symbolized a greater distance from slavery's loss of liberty and prop-
erty alike. Of course, in that case, their appeal had led, one surmises,
to a shift to the standard two-year imprisonment.
IV. TONY PACE AND THE U.S. SUPREME COURT
It might appear that nothing more needed to be decided. Yet,
among the cases appealed from trial courts in late-nineteenth century
Alabama, one went on to the U.S. Supreme Court. The nation's high
court demonstrated no difficulty in accepting the main lines of argu-
ment that supporters of the Alabama antimiscegenation laws had de-
veloped from Ellis in 1868 to Hoover in 1878. Only the aberration of
Burns remained as an exception and thus a reminder that the course
of judicial history on miscegenation was not entirely inevitable.
In November 1881, a Clarke County jury convicted a black man,
Tony Pace, and a white woman, Mary Jane Cox, under section 4189 on
charges of "liv[ing] together in a state of adultery or fornication." 82
Each received the shortest sentence that the law permitted, two years
in the state penitentiary. When they appealed, the Alabama Supreme
Court upheld the convictions. Each defendant's punishment, the
court observed, "white and black," was "precisely the same."'83 The
82. Pace v. State, 69 Ala. 231, 231 (1881).
83. Id. at 232.
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differential punishment for interracial cohabitation was directed not
"against the person of any particular color or race, but against the
offense, the nature of which is determined by the opposite color of the
cohabiting parties," an offense whose "evil tendency" was greater
than if both parties were of the same race, as it might lead to "a mon-
grel population and a degraded civilization." 84
Pace appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.85 Writing for a unani-
mous court, Justice Stephen J. Field rejected the argument that the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause offered a shield.
Rather, he adopted the Alabama court's line of reasoning. Viewing
the two sections of the Alabama law, Justice Field found them "en-
tirely consistent" and in no way racially discriminatory.86 Each, he
insisted in all earnestness, dealt with a different offense. Section 4189,
he wrote,
prescribes a punishment for an offense which can only be commit-
ted where the two sexes are of different races. There is in neither
section any discrimination against either race. Section 4184 equally
includes the offense when the persons of the two sexes are both
white and when they are both black. Section 4189 applies the same
punishment to both offenders, the white and the black. Indeed, the
offense against which this latter section is aimed cannot be commit-
ted without involving persons of both races in the same punishment.
Whatever discrimination is made in the punishment prescribed in
the two sections is directed against the offense designated and not
against the person of any particular color or race.8
7
The decision was understood, from that time to the 1960s, as re-
flecting a validation of state antimiscegenation laws. But the Supreme
Court had not confronted the question of whether, given that Pace
and Cox could not become husband and wife, they would inevitably
be liable to prosecution for "adultery or fornication" if they lived as
such. Only by implication had the ban against interracial marriage
been addressed. Moreover, only by indirection did the Court address
the question of whether, since it was a first offense, the sentence
should have been for no more than six months. In any event, the
Court had upheld the Alabama laws, and no southern state, for the
next eight decades, displayed any inclination to repeal such laws. Cer-
tainly Alabama did not. The Supreme Court's decision in Pace v. Ala-
bama would prove to have an even more durable career in the
84. Id.
85. Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1883).
86. Id. at 585.
87. Id. For further analysis see DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITnTON IN THE SUPREME
COURT- THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS, 1789-1888, at 387-90 (1985).
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American law of interracial sex and, by extension, marriage than
Plessy v. Ferguson would have on segregated transportation and, by
extension, education.
88
V. SEX, MARRIAGE, FAMILY, AND THE LAW OF RACE: VIRGINIA
BEFORE EMANCIPATION AND RECONSTRUCTION
Virginia acted as early as 1691 to outlaw marriages between
whites and nonwhites. Under the law, there never was a time-from
the 1690s to the 1960s-that a marriage across racial lines involving
someone defined as a white person did not carry severe penalties.8 9
In 1662, the colonial assembly first faced the question of the sta-
tus of the children of interracial couples.90 The question before the
legislators was whether "children got by any Englishman upon a negro
woman should be slave or ffree." The new law supplied a solution:
"all children borne in this country shalbe held bond or free only ac-
cording to the condition of the mother." 91 Thus, if the nonwhite wo-
man was free, her mixed-race child would be too. But if she was a
slave, then any child .she had, even with a white father, would be a
slave. The father's identity did not matter, so neither could his race or
his status. It all depended on whether the woman-whatever her
race-was slave or free.
88. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). For some fascinating contemporary statements
about the legal situation in Louisiana, which permitted interracial marriages but barred whites
from sitting as equals with nonwhites in railway cars, see CHARLES A. LOFGREN, THE PLESSY
CASE: A LEGAL-HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION 46, 50, 56 (1987).
89. Paul Finkelman, The Crime of Color, 67 TUL L. REV. 2063, 2081-87 (1993).
90. The mixed-race children who gave rise to the 1662 law reflected, on the one hand, the
difference in power between white men who owned slaves and black women who were slaves
and, on the other, the skewed sex ratio in Virginia. At the time of the new law's enactment,
white men recognized a severe shortage of white women. According to one set of figures, the
largest number of white immigrants to Virginia to date arrived in 1653-probably at least three-
fourths of them men-and many more arrived in the next few years. WESLEY F. CRAVEN,
WHITE, RED, AND BLACK: THE SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY VIRGINIAN 15, 26-27 (1971).
Meantime, the largest number to date of black newcomers to Virginia arrived in 1656, and an-
other new high was recorded in 1661. ld. at 85-86. A large majority of these new black Virgini-
ans, like their white counterparts, were men (probably about two out of three), but, from the
perspective of white men bereft of white women, the black women might offset some of the
shortfall in white women. Id. at 99.
91. Act of Dec. 1662, No. 12, 1662 Va. Acts 170; Finkelman, supra note 89, at 2082-85. Two
other surveys of Virginia's miscegenation statutes are Walter Wadlington, The Loving Case: Vir-
ginia's Anti-Miscegenation Statute in Historical Perspective, 52 VA. L. REV. 1189 (1966), and
Frank F. Arness, The Evolution of the Virginia Antimiscegenation Laws (1966) (unpublished
M.A. thesis, Old Dominion College). Both were used in 1966-67 by the Lovings' lawyers to
recount that history. Brief for Appellants at 15, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (No. 395),
reprinted in 64 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED




The 1662 Act assumed that the child was born to an unmarried
couple. It did not address the question of interracial marriage itself.
A successor act in 1691 faced the question of marriage. It is an amaz-
ing law, couched in language at once confused and hysterical,
designed "for [the] prevention of that abominable mixture and spuri-
ous issue which hereafter may encrease in this dominion, as well by
negroes, mulattoes, and Indians intermarrying with English, or other
white woman, as by their unlawfull accompanying with one an-
other."92 Mixed race children, that is, "that abominable mixture and
spurious issue," troubled the assembly if their mothers were white, not
if they were black. The old rule continued to operate for the mixed-
race children of white fathers, but a new rule targeted the problem of
mixed-race children of white mothers.
93
When the 1691 law turned to implementing a solution to the
problem it had just articulated, the first thing it did was to outlaw in-
terracial marriage for white men and white women alike. Actually, it
did not ban the marriage, but rather, mandated the banishment of the
white party to any interracial marriage that occurred, if free and thus
owing labor to no planter: "[W]hatsoever English or other white man
or women being free shall intermarry with a negroe, mulatto, or In-
dian man or woman bond or free shall within three months after such
marriage be banished and removed from this dominion forever. .... "94
Perceiving that not all Virginia laws secured the full attention of local
authorities, the Burgesses directed that "the justices of each respective
countie within this dominion make it their perticular care, that this act
be put in effectuall execution. '9
5
In view of the provision for banishment, perhaps few white wo-
men involved in interracial marriages would still be in the colony
when their children came along. But this addressed only the question
of the children of white women who actually went through a wedding
ceremony, those whose relationship was, up to that time, "lawful."
What about children whose parents' "accompanying with one an-
other" was "unlawful"? Any "such bastard child," mixed-race and
92. Act of April 1691, No. 16, 1691 Va. Acts 86, 86.
93. Id.; Finkelman, supra note 89, at 2085-86. For examples of black-white marriages in
Virginia in the late-seventeenth century, see EDMUND S. MORGAN, AMERICAN SLAVERY, AMER-
ICAN FREEDOM: THE ORDEAL OF COLONIAL VIRGINIA 334-35 (1975). For extended discussion
and analysis, see A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., & Barbara K. Kopytoff, Racial Purity and Interra-
cial Sex in the Law of Colonial and Antebellum Virginia, 77 GEO. LJ. 1967 (1989), and Kathleen
M. Brown, Gender and the Genesis of a Race and Class System in Virginia, 1630-1750, at 337-80
(1990) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin (Madison)).
94. 1691 Va. Acts at 87.
95. Id.
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born in Virginia, was to be taken by the wardens of the church in the
parish where the child was born and "bound out as a servant ... untill
he or she shall attaine the age of thirty yeares." 96
One other component of this measure targeted the white mothers
of interracial children: "[i]f any English woman being free shall have a
bastard child by any negro or mulatto," she must, within a month of
the birth, pay a fine of fifteen pounds sterling to the church wardens in
her parish. If she could not pay the fine, the church wardens were to
auction off her services for five years. If a servant and thus not own-
ing her own labor at the time of the offense, her sale for five years
would take place after she had completed her current indenture.97
The law said nothing about the father of her child. It imposed no
penalty of loss of labor or liberty, though it surely broke up any family
there might have been. The father was important to the law because,
regardless of whether he was free or slave, he was nonwhite and had
fathered a child by a white woman. The penalties were imposed on
the woman and their child.
The specific question of 1662-regarding the status, slave or free,
of the child of a white man and a black woman-retained the same
answer three decades later, that is, that it depended on the status of
the mother. The 1691 legislature worried about other questions, how-
ever, and it devised a new rule to address them. The new rule meant
that the identity of the father could be as important as that of the
mother. The primary question of the status of a child in Virginia now
had to do with whether the mother was white or black, not whether
she was free or slave. Most black women were slaves, so most chil-
dren of black women would be slaves, though free children would still
be born to free black mothers. If the mother was white, the answer
depended on the racial identity of the father. The legislature's object
there was to retain scarce white women for white men.98 The crime,
96. Id.
97. Id. Hoping to foster enforcement, the legislature provided that one-third of the fine (or
proceeds of sale) would go to "the informer." Id.
98. MORGAN, supra note 93, at 336. In the seventeenth century's final quarter, white immi-
gration to Virginia declined, and natural increase went up; births began to contribute more than
immigration to population growth, and of course Virginia-born youngsters had a sex ratio near
parity. By the 1690s, therefore, in aggregate terms, the white sex ratio was moving toward par-
ity, but it was not doing so among the large cohort that had immigrated during the century's
third quarter, nor for the more recent arrivals; for those cohorts, white women remained in short
supply. CRAVEN, supra note 90, at 15-16, 25-27. Moreover, in 1690 and again in 1691, more
black newcomers reached Virginia than in any previous year-and a large majority of these were
men, men who, like their surviving elders who had arrived earlier, could see that black women
were in short supply in Virginia. Id. at 86, 99. White men could nonetheless see that perhaps
one-third of all black newcomers were female, and the rising generation of Virginia-born blacks
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such as it was, entailed a sexual relationship between a white woman
and a nonwhite man.
After 1691, the broad contours of Virginia's laws on race, sex, and
marriage showed limited change through the colonial era, the Revolu-
tion, and even the Civil War. Legislation in 1705 introduced three
significant changes. It defined a "mulatto" as any mixed-race Virgin-
ian with at least one-eighth African ancestry. 99 Under a new law in
1705 "for a further prevention of that abominable mixture and spuri-
ous issue," a white Virginian would face six months in prison and a
fine rather than suffer exile for marrying a nonwhite. 100 The legisla-
ture set a fine of 10,000 pounds of tobacco for any preacher who offici-
ated at a marriage between a white and a nonwhite; half that amount
would go to the colony and half to the informer.' 0 The "bastard
child" of any "negro, or mulatto," and "a free christian white woman"
would now be bound as a servant until the age of 31, rather than 30; so
would the "bastard child" of a "negro, or mulatto" father and "any
woman servant."'10 2
A 1723 law extended to the next generation the time of servitude
established for female Virginians born under the laws of 1691 and
1705. Hereafter,
where any female mullatto, or indian, by law obliged to serve 'till
the age of thirty or thirty-one years, shall during the time of her
servitude, have any child born of her body, every such child shall
serve the master or mistress of such mullatto or indian, until it shall
attain the same age the mother of such child was by law obliged to
serve unto.'
0 3
In 1765, the Virginia legislature relaxed the terms of its 1691, 1705,
and 1723 legislation in one important respect. Children born after
included about equal numbers of males and females. Surely the 1691 law reflected the competi-
tion between black men and white men for female companionship, and white men had a monop-
oly on power in the House of Burgesses.
99. In framing an act "declaring who shall not bear office in this country" that excluded
"any negro, mulatto, or Indian," the Virginia legislature defined "mulatto"-for the purpose of
"clearing all manner of doubts" that might develop regarding "the construction of this act, or
any other act"-as "the child, grand child, or great grand child, of a negro." Act of Oct. 1705, ch.
4, 1705 Va. Acts 250, 250-52. The statute must have sufficed at the time to exclude virtually all
Virginians with any traceable African ancestry. In 1705, only 86 years after the first arrival of
African Americans in the Virginia colony, probably few great-great-grandchildren of a black
Virginian had yet been born, let alone grown old enough to marry or hold public office.
100. Act of Oct. 1705, ch. 49, § 19, 1705 Va. Acts 447, 453.
101. Id. § 20, at 454.
102. Id. § 18, at 452-53.
103. Act of May 1723, ch. 4, § 22, 1723 Va. Acts 126, 133. The 1723 Act went far to perfect
Virginia's laws of race and slavery; the same statute barred slaveowners from freeing any of their
"negro, mullatto, or indian slaves" and declared, too, that "no free negro, mullatto, or indian"
would vote in any subsequent election. Id. §§ 17, 23, at 132-34.
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that time who would have been subject to the previous laws would
serve much shorter periods, males to the age of 21 and females to
18.104
One family's story illustrates the complexity that developed in the
years that followed the passage of the 1691 law. An eighteenth-cen-
tury Virginia resident, described as a "Christian white woman," had a
daughter, Betty Bugg, whose father was black. Under Virginia law,
Betty Bugg became a servant until the age of 31. During her servi-
tude, she had a son, who, while in his twenties, brought suit for his
freedom on several grounds. Against that effort, his master's lawyer
argued successfully in 1769 that (1) a 1705 statute required that mixed-
race children like Betty Bugg (whose mothers were not slaves) be
bound out for 31 years but, silent on the status of their children, pre-
sumably left them free; (2) a 1723 act required children of that next
generation, too, to live as servants to age 31, and, since Bugg's son was
born after 1723, he was subject to that law; and (3) a 1764 law could
not help him, even though, for people with such lineage as Betty Bugg
as well as her children, it set their terms of servitude at 18 for females
and 21 for males. Born after 1723 but before 1764, he was born too
late to gain his freedom at birth and too soon to obtain it at age 21.
Yet, his bondage was not defined in terms of life, for he was scheduled
to become free at age 31.105
Virginia's laws on sex, race, and marriage underwent further de-
velopment after independence. A 1785 law redefined "mulatto" as a
mixed-race Virginian with at least one-fourth African ancestry, or one
black grandparent, a fraction that persisted into the twentieth cen-
tury. °6 A 1792 act abandoned the language of "abominable mixture"
to speak instead simply of "preventing white men and women inter-
marrying with negroes or mulattoes"; repeated the fine (but converted
it from pounds to $30) and the six-month sentence for "whatsoever
white man or woman, being free," who married "a negro or mulatto
man or woman, bond or free"; and it converted to $250 the fine for
104. The 1765 Act termed being bound out until the age of 30 or 31 "an unreasonable sever-
ity" and directed that "such bastard children already born, and not yet bound out, or which shall
hereafter be born, either of white women servants or of free christian white women," should be
bound out for the much shorter terms. Act of Oct. 1765, ch. 14, § 3, 1765 Va. Acts 133, 134.
105. Note that the court dated the 1765 Act to 1764 and that, though the 1760s statute re-
lated solely to the children of white mothers (see supra note 104), Betty Bugg was not white.
Gwinn v. Bugg, Jefferson 87 (1769). For another example, see T. 0. MADDEN, JR., WE WERE
ALWAYS FREE: THE MADDENS OF CULIEPER COUNTY, VIRGINIA, A 200-YEAR FAMILY His-
TORY 1-25 (1992). Regarding "the problem of racial identity," see JAMES H. JOHNSTON, RACE
RELATIONS IN VIRGINIA AND MISCEGENATION IN THE SOUT, 1776-1860, at 191-215 (1970).
106. Act of Oct. 1785, ch. 78, § 1, 1785 Va. Acts 184.
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any minister or other Virginian who might "presume" to preside over
an interracial marriage.10 7 In 1848, the Virginia legislature modified
the 1792 law against miscegenous marriages. It changed the term of
imprisonment from a mandatory six-months to a maximum twelve-
months; raised the maximum fine from $30 to $100; and lowered the
mandatory fine against ministers who presided at interracial marriages
from $250 to $200.108 Finally, the Code of 1849 and the Code of 1860
each declared that "all marriages between a white person and a negro
[including mulattoes]. .. shall be absolutely void, without any decree
of divorce, or other legal process." 109
The Code of 1860 framed the law as it would stand for many
years in its prohibition of any marriage between a "white" person and
a "negro" or "colored person." The 1860 Code declared it a crime for
any clerk of court to knowingly "issue a marriage license contrary to
law," for anyone to "perform the ceremony of marriage between a
white person and a negro," or for any "white person" to "intermarry
with a negro." Penalties for violating these provisions were a maxi-
mum fine of $500 and a maximum imprisonment of a year for a clerk
of court who wrongfully issued a marriage license; the mandatory fine
of $200 for a person presiding at a banned marriage ceremony; and jail
for as long as a year and a fine as high as $100 for a white person who
married anyone of at least one-fourth African ancestry.1t 0
107. Act of Dec. 22, 1792, ch. 42, §§ 17-18, 1792 Va. Acts 130, 134-35. Despite Virginia's
official position on such matters, see Thomas E. Buckley, Unfixing Race: Class, Power, and Iden-
tity in an Interracial Family, 102 VA. MAO. HIsT. & BIOGRAPHY 349 (1994), a story about a white
planter, Thomas Wright, and his full-blooded black slave companion Sylvia, whose mulatto son
Robert Wright, born in 1780 and freed at the age of 21 in 1801, married Mary Godsey, a white
woman, in 1806 and in 1816 petitioned the legislature for a divorce from her on grounds of
desertion and adultery. It appears that no legal action was ever taken against him-or her-for
their interracial relationship, but as Buckley notes about the legislature's summary rejection of
his petition, "Although Wright could be married to a white woman in his community, he could
not be married to her in law." Id. at 363. His marriage violated official policy, and the legisla-
ture would not grant him a divorce. Other evidence also suggests that antimiscegenation laws
were not heavily enforced in Virginia during the first half of the nineteenth century. In a single
county, Nansemond, the census taker in 1830 indicated nine cases where a free black man lived
with "his white wife." JOHlNSTON, supra note 105, at 265-66. For a discussion, however, of two
prosecutions involving white men, one in the 1820s with a free mulatto woman, the other in the
1840s with a slave woman (not his own), see Higginbotham & Kopytoff, supra note 93, at 2003-
04.
108. Act of 1848, ch. 8, §§ 4-5, 1848 Va. Acts 110, 111.
109. 31 VA. CODE ch. 109, § 1 (1849); 31 VA. CODE ch. 109, § 1 (1860).
110. 31 VA. CODE ch. 109, § 1 (1860); 54 VA. CODE ch. 196, § 4 (1860); 54 VA. CODE ch. 196,
§§ 8-9 (1860).
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VI. RACE, SEX, AND MARRIAGE IN EARLY-POSTWAR VIRGINIA
The legal definition of a white person in nineteenth-century Vir-
ginia required that a person have less than one-fourth African ances-
try-if one grandparent was fully black, even if the other three
grandparents were fully white, the person was legally nonwhite. Yet,
the "one drop" rule that came to prevail in the twentieth century had
no place in the law at that time. On the eve of the Civil War, accord-
ing to the Code of Virginia, "[e]very person who has one-fourth part
or more of negro blood shall be deemed a mulatto, and the word 'ne-
gro' ... [in any Virginia statute] shall be construed to mean mulatto as
well as negro."'111 Following the war, an 1866 act offered new lan-
guage, dropping the term "mulatto," but left the definitions largely
intact. The new act stated that "every person having one-fourth or
more of negro blood, shall be deemed a colored person, and every
person, not a colored person, having one-fourth or more of Indian
blood, shall be deemed an Indian."
112
For a time after Emancipation, the Virginia General Assembly
took little action to tighten the laws on interracial relationships.
Changes in the statutes applied prewar laws to postwar conditions:
they applied the general Virginia laws on sex and marriage to freed-
men and freedwomen. 113 For example, the 1860 Code had specified a
minimum fine of $20 for any "free person" who committed "adultery
or fornication," and thus it had excluded slaves. 114 The postwar pen-
alty, still a fine of at least $20, applied to all residents. 1 5 As in Ala-
bama, relationships in Virginia that clearly persisted beyond single
sexual encounters outside marriage might incur greater penalties. The
1860 Code had called for a minimum fine of $50 for "any white per-
sons, not married to each other," who "lewdly and lasciviously associ-
ate and cohabit together .... "116 After Emancipation, the racial
qualifier vanished from the law on cohabitation: "If any persons, not
married to each other, lewdly and lasciviously associate and cohabit
together.... they shall be fined not less than fifty nor more than five
hundred dollars.""
7
111. 30 VA. CODE ch. 103, § 9 (1860).
112. Act of Feb. 27, 1866, ch. 17, § 1, 1866 Va. Acts 84.
113. Act of Feb. 27, 1866, ch. 18, 1866 Va. Acts 85, 85-86.
114. 54 VA. CODE ch. 196, § 6 (1860).
115. 54 VA. CODE ch. 192, § 6 (1873).
116. 54 VA. CODE ch. 196, § 7 (1860).
117. 54 VA. CODE ch. 192, § 7 (1873).
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If living together without benefit of marriage was banned in post-
Civil War Virginia, for blacks as well as whites, so was marriage if it
involved crossing racial lines. The Code of 1873 persisted in declaring
miscegenous marriages "absolutely void," while the law continued for
a time to penalize only white partners in such marriages.118 The pen-
alty for living together outside marriage, unlike that against interracial
marriage, could apply to people of any race. The language of the
postwar Code clearly permitted indictments against both partners in
an interracial couple-and black couples as well as white couples-
who lived together outside marriage, with potential fines ranging from
$50 to $500. Authorities brought such charges and imposed such fines;
perhaps they were particularly likely to do so when interracial couples
came to their attention-and interracial couples were incapable of
getting married to satisfy the law. The law in Virginia, however, in
contrast to the law in Alabama, did not specify interracial cohabita-
tion as a separate crime with more stringent penalties than single-race
relationships.
Given the wartime carnage, white women of marrying age in Vir-
ginia faced a shortage of eligible white men in the early postwar
years.119 Meanwhile, emancipation greatly increased the number of
Virginians whose marital relations were of interest to public officials.
As early as 1866 and 1867, newspapers published reports of interracial
relationships in Virginia. Together, such reports supplied evidence
that some men and women sought to forge marriages across racial
lines and that sometimes the law intervened. In 1867, newspapers re-
ported that black preachers officiated when "a negro man married a
so-called white woman" in Wytheville and when a freedman from
Winchester joined in "an amalgamation marriage" with a white wo-
man there. In Bedford County in 1868, the county clerk refused to
118. 31 VA. CODE ch. 192, §§ 8-9 (1873); 54 VA. CODE ch. 192, §§ 8-9 (1873); Wadlington,
supra note 91, at 1195 n.48. With regard to the maximum imprisonment of twelve months for a
"white person" who married a "negro," and the maximum fine of $100, the Code of 1873 specifi-
cally noted that "[a] similar penalty is not imposed on the negro." 54 VA. CODE ch. 192, § 8
(1873).
119. One the eve of the Civil War, females comprised 51 percent of white Virginians in their
twenties; men comprised 51 of those in their thirties. 2 UNrrED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, supra
note 24, at 620. The 1870 census showed as many males as females below the age of twenty-one
and again in the age-group 45-59. In between those two categories, by contrast, males were in a
substantial deficit: only 47 percent of the 21-24 age-group, 46 percent among white Virginians
ages 35-39 and 40-44, and not quite 45 percent in the 25-29 and 30-34 groups. Id. at 612-14.
"Colored" Virginians, too, displayed a deficit of males in the age-groups from 21-24 through 40-
44, id. at 652-55, so the enormous number of deaths of Civil War soldiers was not the only force
at work to skew the sex ratios, but many white women-and perhaps black women, too-none-
theless had reason to downplay race in their quest for marriage partners. See, WiLtuAMSON,
supra note 18, at 89-90.
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issue a marriage license to a black man, Henry Dunham, who in-
tended to marry a white woman; when the clerk explained that
Virginia law banned such a marriage, "Dunham became very indig-
nant. ' 120 In 1870 a Smyth County court convicted a black preacher of
officiating at the marriage of a black man and a white woman, fined
him the mandated $200, and jailed him for four months.12'
In 1868, a Richmond paper reported that "some of the Yankees
who have come to this city since the close of the war have illustrated
their belief in the doctrine of negro equality by marrying negro wo-
men." 22 It pointed to two examples of "white men from the North"
marrying mixed-race women, marriages that were "solemnized," it
seemed, in Washington, D.C., not Virginia. 23
At the 1877-78 session, the Virginia legislature took stronger ac-
tion against interracial marriages. An 1878 statute ended the lopsided
nature of the Virginia prohibition on interracial marriage that had im-
posed criminal penalties only on .the white partner, and it vastly in-
creased those penalties. The 1860 Code had targeted the white
partner alone. The penalties could be steep, or they could be nominal:
confinement "in jail not more than one year" and a fine "not exceed-
ing one hundred dollars."' 24 The 1878 revision declared, instead, that
"[a]ny white person who shall intermarry with a negro, or any negro
who shall intermarry with a white person, shall be confined in the pen-
itentiary not less than two nor more than five years."'1 25 Thus, the new
law eliminated the cash fine, but it subjected whites and blacks alike
to felony convictions. By the back door, Virginia had begun in this
sense to apply equal protection. There was now a minimum penalty
that exceeded the previous maximum, and the place of confinement
was now the penitentiary, not the local jail.126 The law retained the
120. ALRuTHEus A. TAYLOR, THE NEGRO IN THE RECONTRUCTION OF VIRGINA 59 (1926).
121. Id. at 54-62. For other accounts see CHARLES E. WYNEs, RACE RELATIONS IN VIR-
GINIA, 1870-1902, at 92-94 (1971), and SAMUEL N. PINCUS, THE VIRGINIA SUPREME COURT,
BLACKS, AND THE LAW, 1870-1902, at 63-84 (1990).
122. TAYLOR, supra note 120, at 58.
123. Id. The newspaper accounts do not make it clear whether these couples had left Vir-
ginia to get married or had been married before they entered the state. Virginia laws could
explain why the marriage ceremonies had taken place outside the state, though they did not
explain any failure by authorities to prosecute the newlyweds-as they might have, for living
together as a married couple though they had no valid marriage-when they came to Virginia. It
may be that those mixed-race women were less than one-fourth black.
124. 54 VA. CODE ch. 196, § 8 (1860). The code of 1873 left all that alone. 54 VA. CODE ch.
105, § 8 (1873).




$200 fine against presiding ministers as well as the penalties of as
much as a $500 fine and a year in jail for an offending court clerk.' 27
The same law closed another ancient loophole. It now applied to
race what had previously applied to brother-sister and other same-
race categories of marriages banned under state law:
[Ilf any white person and negro, shall go out of this state for the
purpose of being married, and with the intention of returning, and
be married out of it, and afterwards return to and reside in it, co-
habiting as man and wife, they shall be as guilty, and be punished as
if the marriage had been in this state. The fact of their cohabitation
here as man and wife shall be evidence of their marriage.'8
The rules against enduring sexual relationships across racial lines in
Virginia, whether within marriage or not, were now fully developed.
Under the statutes, the crime and the punishment alike showed little
change from the late 1870s to the time of the Lovings.
VII. INTERRACIAL COUPLES AND THE VIRGINIA COURTS,
1877-1883
The nineteenth-century Virginia version of the story differed
from Alabama's in two major ways. First, the Old Dominion's history
betrayed no prewar time of a relaxed legal regime on matters of mis-
cegenous marriage. Second, Virginia's Supreme Court never ruled
against the constitutionality of the legislature's handiwork. The two
states nonetheless resembled each other in that an important series of
cases came before each state's high court between about 1877 and
1883.
In Alabama, as a rule, convictions were upheld: only one convic-
tion was overturned, and that case involved a justice of the peace who
had presided at an interracial marriage. In Virginia, though the law
was clear and unyielding in principle, a number of appeals led to
reversal of the trial courts' convictions. Thus, Alabama was more
relaxed before 1865, and its high court actually declared antimis-
cegenation laws unconstitutional for a time during Reconstruction.
Virginia, by contrast, though firmly opposed to interracial marriages
from the late seventeenth century on, saw its high court relax the im-
plementation of that ban under circumstances that judges found to
appear uncertain. Despite these dissimilarities, by 1883 the major
127. Id. §§ 4, 9, at 302-03.
128. Id. at § 3. Such restrictions had appeared in Virginia law as early as 1818; a version
from 1819 had applied language of that sort only to people "within certain degrees of relation-
ship." Act of Feb. 25, 1818, ch. 18, 1818 Va. Acts 18, 19; VA. CODE ch. 108, § 18 (1819).
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questions in both states had been clearly resolved in favor of a highly
restrictive racial environment on who could marry whom.
When cases arose in Virginia regarding race, sex, and marriage,
the definition of the racial boundary could prove to be of central im-
portance. McPherson v. Commonwealth129 illustrates this. The case
arose from events that occurred across the James River from Rich-
mond in the city of Manchester, where Rowena McPherson and
George Stewart faced charges of "living [together] in illicit inter-
course." They were convicted and fined despite their insistence that
they were legally married. The trial court determined that he was
white but she was not. Thus, their marriage was not valid and could
supply no shield in their defense. 130 A unanimous state supreme
court, to the contrary, judged the facts to suggest that McPherson was
not, in fact, "a negro." Her father was white (the court seems to have
taken that as meaning he was 100 percent of non-African ancestry);
her maternal grandfather was also white, and thus she was at least
three-fourths white. 131 Because three-fourths white would leave her
nonwhite in the eyes of the law at that time in Virginia, the case
hinged on the racial ancestry of her maternal grandmother. If that
grandmother had been entirely African, then McPherson was non-
white, but otherwise she qualified as white. Testimony from the fam-
ily stipulated that the mother of that grandmother-and thus
McPherson's great-grandmother-was "a brown skin woman," "half-
Indian."'1 32 Thus, the court concluded that "less than one-fourth" of
Rowena McPherson's "blood" was "negro blood." And "[i]f it be but
one drop less, she is not a negro.' 33 Because she had, therefore, not
married across race lines, the marriage was valid, so they were not
guilty of the offense of which they had been convicted. 34
A few years later, similar charges jeopardized the relationship of
William H. Scott and Retta Jackson in Culpeper County. 35 Convicted
in 1882 of "unlawful, lewd and lascivious associating and cohabiting"
with Jackson, and fined $75, Scott appealed to the state's high court. 136
One of his grounds for appeal was that the indictment had been
brought only against him and not also against Jackson. The court re-
129. 69 Va. (28 Gratt.) 939 (1877).
130. Id.




135. Scott v. Commonwealth, 77 Va. 344 (1883).
136. Id. at 345.
1994]
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
jected that argument and all the other arguments he mounted. Writ-
ing for the court, Judge Thomas T. Fauntleroy noted that "Scott, a
white man, admitted that Jackson, a colored woman, was his wife; that
they lived together; that he, Scott, admitted that Jackson's daughter
was his child."'1 37 Other witnesses testified that Scott "carried her mail
to her from the post-office," that "he familiarly associated with the
woman, Jackson," and that "he live[d] with her as man and wife. ' 13
8
Thus, in this case, unlike McPherson's, the appeals court upheld the
conviction. They had lived as husband and wife, and they had not
denied that one was white and the other not. Even in the absence of
racial considerations, the conviction could well have been sought and
upheld, though-a critical distinction-two people of the same race
had the option of marrying to avoid prosecution.
In another decison, also written by Judge Fauntleroy, the Virginia
appeals court reversed the conviction of D'Orsay Jones for "lewd and
lascivious cohabitation"-outside of marriage-with Kate Oliver. 139
Though he was black and she was white, the court's opinion does not
even suggest a racial component.140 And though they may have had
sexual relations, the court took pains to insist that the offense charged
in the indictment was for "lewdly and lasciviously associat[ing] and
cohabit[ing] together," not fornication or adultery.' 41 For the more
serious charge to stick, there had to be "cohabitation" and it had to be
"lewd and lascivious"; "[t]here must be a living together.' 42 Yet, tes-
timony had gone no farther than the "mere implication that he might
possibly have had some intimacy with her," and "[t]he facts certified
prove that he did not cohabit with her.' 43 Thus, the court reversed
the decision and remanded the case.
One Virginia case, related directly to the 1878 statute, soon devel-
oped in the federal courts.'" Edmund Kinney, a black man, had mar-
ried Mary S. Hall, a white woman, in Washington, D.C., in 1878. Then
they returned to their home in Hanover County. Convicted of violat-
ing the 1878 statute against going out of state to get married, both
parties were sentenced to five years of hard labor in the Virginia peni-
tentiary. Kinney petitioned U.S. District Judge Robert W. Hughes for
137. Id. at 346 (emphasis in original).
138. Id.
139. Jones v. Commonwealth, 80 Va. 18 (1885).
140. PINcUs, supra note 121, at 73-74.
141. Jones, 80 Va. at 19.
142. Id. at 20.
143. Id. at 21.
144. Ex parte Kinney, 14 F. Cas. 602 (C.C.E.D. Va. 1879) (No. 7825).
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a writ of habeas corpus. 145 Judge Hughes rejected all of the constitu-
tional grounds advanced by Kinney. He declared that the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment gave "no power to
congress to interfere with the right of a state to regulate the domestic
relations of its own citizens .... ."146 Judge Hughes continued:
But even if it did require an equality of privileges, I do not see any
discrimination against either race in a provision of law forbidding
any white or colored person from marrying another of the opposite
color of skin. If it forbids a colored person from marrying a white, it
equally forbids a white person from marrying a colored.... In the
present case, the white party to the marriage is in imprisonment as
well as the colored person. I think it clear, therefore, that no provi-
sion of the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment has been violated by the
state of Virginia in its prosecution of this petitioner.' 47
These and other cases demonstrated the operations of the law of
freedom as it applied to miscegenous relationships in Virginia; but
even before the 1878 law, the case of Andrew Kinney, a black man,
and Mahala Miller, a white woman, supplied Virginia's major prece-
dent.148 By 1874, they had lived together long enough to have had
three sons born since 1867. 149 Perhaps seeking to avoid charges of
unmarried cohabitation, yet unable to find a preacher who would
marry them in Virginia, they left their home in Augusta County in
November 1874 and traveled to Washington, D.C., to get married.
Then they returned to Augusta County. Though they were married
according to the law of the nation's capital, they were viewed as un-
married by Virginia authorities, who then brought charges against
Kinney for "lewdly associating and cohabiting" with Miller. After be-
ing convicted and fined $500, the maximum fine under the law, Kin-
ney appealed the decision, first to the circuit court and then to the
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals. At trial, he claimed to have a
valid marriage, and his attorney urged the trial judge to instruct the
jury that the marriage was "valid and a bar to this prosecution."'1 50 To
the contrary, the judge instructed the jury that the marriage was "but
a vain and futile attempt to evade the laws of Virginia.' 51 The ques-
tion on appeal, simply put, was: Did the defendant have a valid mar-
riage that gave him an effective defense against the charge he faced?
145. Id. at 603.
146. Id. at 605.
147. Id.
148. Kinney v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. (30 Gratt.) 858 (1878).
149. Manuscript population schedule, Census of 1880.
150. Kinney, 71 Va. (30 Gratt.) at 858-59.
151. Id. at 860.
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Or, rather, was his living as though he were married precisely the basis
for that charge? Was he married? Or was he guilty?
The decision of Virginia's high court remained the leading Vir-
ginia precedent when the Lovings confronted a similar situation. That
court viewed Kinney's action as "a violation of [Virginia's] penal laws
in this most important and vital branch of criminal jurisprudence, af-
fecting the moral well being and social order of this state.' 52 As to
whether the law of Washington, D.C, or that of Virginia-"the lex loci
contractus or the lex domicilii"-governed the case, Judge Joseph
Christian, speaking for a unanimous court, declared: "There can be no
doubt as to the power of every country to make laws regulating the
marriage of its own subjects; to declare who may marry, how they may
marry, and what shall be the legal consequences of their marrying." 153
In this case, the "country" was Virginia, and Kinney was the "subject."
Judge Christian reviewed the precedents, English and American.
Only one case, which related to a marriage that took place in New
England before the American Revolution, seemed to support Kinney.
In that case, which also involved one black partner and one white, the
couple had left Massachusetts, which banned such marriages, and
gone to a neighboring colony, Rhode Island, which did not ban them.
After their wedding ceremony, they returned to Massachusetts. The
Massachusetts court had ruled, as Kinney now asked the Virginia
court to rule, that a marriage, if valid "according to the laws of the
country where it is entered into, shall be valid in any other
country."154
Judge Christian rejected Massachusetts' position. If the ritual it-
self were at issue, the marriage should be recognized as valid. Kinney,
however, faced a problem not of "forms" but of "essentials,"' 155 and
"the essentials of the contract depend upon.., the law of the country
:. . in which the matrimonial residence is contemplated.' 56 As the
judge noted,
The purity of public morals, the moral and physical development of
both races, and the highest advancement of our cherished southern
civilization, under which two distinct races are to work out and ac-
complish the destiny to which the Almighty has assigned them on
152. Id. at 861-62.
153. Id. at 862.
154. Medway v. Needham, 16 Mass. 157, 158 (1819). The New England marriage had taken
place at some time before 1770. The case arose in 1819 over which of two towns was responsible
for maintaining them as aged paupers; the case gives the name of Ishmael Coffee, the black man,
but not of his "supposed wife," a white woman. Id. at 159.
155. Kinney, 71 Va. (30 Gratt.) at 864.
156. ld. at 868.
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this continent-all require that they should be kept distinct and sep-
arate, and that connections and alliances so unnatural that God and
nature seem to forbid them, should be prohibited by positive law,
and be subject to no evasion. 157
What "God and nature" had sundered, let no man seek to bring
together. The state of Virginia would not allow a marriage, such as
the one Andrew Kinney and Mahala Miller had contracted, to per-
sist-at least in Virginia. "If the parties desire to maintain the rela-
tions of man and wife, they must change their domicile and go to some
state or country where the laws recognize the validity of such mar-
riages. ' 158 The 1880 census nonetheless showed the Kinneys-now in
their forties and the parents of five sons-still living together in Au-
gusta County.1
59
As the courts wrestled with such questions-and, in particular,
with the complicated matter of racial identity-individual Virginians'
freedom remained in jeopardy, as a Montgomery County case illus-
trates. In February 1883, Isaac Jones obtained a license to marry
Martha Ann Gray. The license listed both parties as "black." That
month, Reverend Charles S. Schaeffer performed the marriage cere-
mony at "the colored Baptist church near Christiansburg," where
Schaeffer, a former Freedmen's Bureau agent, had ministered since
the 1860s.160 All had perhaps gone well enough at first in the new
couple's life, but then they were indicted in September 1883 for "felo-
niously" marrying across race lines-he "a negro" and she "a white
person." Convicted in county court, he was sentenced to the peniten-
tiary for two years and nine months, and she for the minimum two
years. They appealed their convictions to the Montgomery County
circuit court, which affirmed the decision of the trial court, and then to
the state supreme court. 16' They asserted that the 1878 statute vio-
lated the U.S. Constitution, 62 and they denied that the statute applied
to them. Jones claimed to be mixed-race and not "negro." Gray, who
157. Id. at 869.
158. Id. at 870.
159. Manuscript population schedule, supra note 149. A mixed-race family from Pittsylvania
County-a white man, a nonwhite woman, and their two daughters-supplies an alternative
story line. Martha Logan, who was born free, one-fourth black, and three-fourths white, and
James Miliam maintained a monogamous extralegal relationship for fifty years beginning in the
late 1850s. SARAH DELANY ET. AL, HAVING OUR SAY: THE DELANY SISTERS' FIRST 100
YEARS 28-35 (1993).
160. Jones v. Commonwealth, 79 Va. 213, 216-17 (1884) [hereinafter Jones I]; Ann S. Swain,
Christiansburg Institute: From Freedmen's Bureau Enterprise to Public High School 25, 66-67
(1975) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Radford University).
161. Jones v. Commonwealth, 80 Va. 538, 541 (1885) [hereinafter Jones II].
162. Id. at 540.
19941
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
"was accustomed to associate and attend church with the negroes,"
claimed to be mixed-race and not "white." The church pastor had tes-
tified that some "colored persons attending his church" were "whiter"
than she.163 Speaking on July 24, 1884, for a divided court, Judge
Thomas T. Fauntleroy noted that Jones stood "convicted of a crime,
not only against the law of Virginia, but against the just sensibilities of
her civilization.' 164 Yet, Judge Fauntleroy said that the State had
failed to carry the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus,
the appeals court reversed the couple's convictions and remanded
their case to Montgomery County for a new trial.165
On August 3, within two weeks of the appeals court's reversal,
the county court came to the same judgment it had the year before.
The circuit court again confirmed that decision, and "the prisoners"
again appealed. The following June, the state supreme court again
reversed and remanded. Applying its reasoning from the 1877 Mc-
Pherson decision, it rejected Isaac Jones's contention that the statute
did not apply to mixed-race Virginians but insisted nonetheless that
the law applied only to people at least one-fourth black. What was his
racial status under the law? What, for that matter, was hers? The
court could not tell. 6 6 This time, again with Judge Drury A. Hinton
dissenting, Judge Benjamin Watkins Lacy wrote:
The charge against Isaac Jones is, that he is a negro, and that being a
negro he was married to a white woman. To be a negro is not a
crime; to marry a white woman is not a crime; but to be a negro, and
being a negro, to marry a white woman is a felony; therefore it is
essential to the crime that the accused shall be a negro-unless he is
a negro he is guilty of no offence. 167
Jones had both European and African ancestry, and the crucial
question was how much of each. The prosecution, however, had
developed
no evidence of his parentage except that his mother was a yellow
woman. If his mother was a yellow woman with more than half of
her blood derived from the white race, and his father a white man,
he is not a negro. If he is a man of mixed blood he is not a negro,
unless he has one-fourth at least of negro blood in his veins, and this
must be proved by the commonwealth as an essential part of the
crime, without which it cannot exist.' 68
163. Id. at 541-42.
164. Jones 1, 79 Va. at 216.
165. Id. at 219.
166. Jones I1, 80 Va. at 541-44.
167. Id. at 542.
168. Id. at 544.
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Because, Lacy wrote, "every accused person is to be presumed to be
innocent until his guilt is proved, this person must be presumed not to
be a negro until he is proved to be such."'169 Two years and three
months after their wedding, the couple's freedom to live together as
husband and wife-and out of prison for doing so-remained in the
hands of the Virginia courts.
The politics of judicial recruitment had some bearing on the way
in which southern appellate courts handled such miscegenation cases
as came before them. The period of greatest uncertainty and greatest
fluidity came in the 1870s, when the new constitutional dispensation
still offered the possibility that the Fourteenth Amendment controlled
state action on the subject. Republican judges sat on the Alabama
Supreme Court for a time, and the only example of a nineteenth cen-
tury court overturning a conviction for violating an antimiscegenation
statute came at that time.170 When Democrats resumed control of the
Alabama court, a new approach to the Fourteenth Amendment, one
that narrowed it to the vanishing point, quickly took shape.
The story in Virginia, an Upper South state, differed a bit. The
constitutionality of antimiscegenation laws did not give Virginian
judges much pause, and there was no anomalous anti-antimiscegena-
tion ruling to ignore, explain away, or reverse. Not until 1877 did the
supreme court of Virginia hand down a ruling on miscegenation, and
it employed that state's one-fourth definition of a person of color to
overturn a conviction. But Reconstruction came late to Virginia; the
court that ruled on miscegenation cases for a period beginning in 1883
was appointed by a legislature controlled by Readjusters, a biracial
coalition that proved more latitudinarian in its definition of racial
equality. 17' Thus, it can be surmised that when Judge Fauntleroy
spoke for the court, he spoke in a way that pushed the envelope about
as far as could be done in 1880s Virginia, particularly when the consti-
169. Id. at 544-45.
170. The second time an American court ruled an antimiscegenation statute unconstitutional
came in California in 1948. Perez v. Sharp, 138 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948). For a full history see Mar-
tyn, supra note 3.
171. Peter Wallenstein, 'These New and Strange Beings. Women in the Legal Profession in
Virginia, 1890-1990, 101 VA. MAG. HIsT. & BIOGRAPHY 199-200 (1993); Jack P. Maddex, Jr.,
Virginia: The Persistence of Centrist Hegemony, in RECONSTRUCION AND REDEMPTION IN THE
SouTH 113, 146-50 (Otto H. Olsen ed., 1980). Jane E. Dailey, Race, Sex, and Citizenship: Bira-
cial Democracy in Readjuster Virginia, 1879-1883, at 203-16, 224-46 (1995) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Princeton University), analyzes the relationship between postwar Virginia politics
and whites' fears of miscegenation. Angered at the racist symbolism and concerned at the prac-
tical pitfalls, black Readjusters in the legislature sought repeal of the new antimiscegenation law,
but white Readjusters refused to support the effort. Id. at 226-28.
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tutional argument appeared to have played out in 1883, the same year
that the Readjuster judges took their seats.
Either way, in the 1870s or the 1880s, the latitudinarian interlude,
such as it was, proved brief. Particularly after the U.S. Supreme Court
gave its approval to antimiscegenation laws, the Fourteenth Amend-
ment proved ineffective, and the antimiscegenation statutes endured.
What might not have been predicted was that what followed in the
first half of the twentieth century was a more rigid, more exclusive
racial regime than the late-nineteenth century paraded.
VIII. TOWARD GREATER EXCLUSION: THE 1910S AND 1920s
Regarding race, sex, and marriage, the law of freedom in both
Alabama and Virginia had largely concluded its development by the
early 1880s. It congealed in its 1880s form and, for the most part,
stayed that way well into the 1960s.172 The most significant change-
which occurred at about the same time in both states-made the law
more restrictive, not less.
Under Alabama law, beginning with the Code of 1852, a "mu-
latto" was a mixed-race "negro" who had "descended... from negro
ancestors, to the third generation inclusive, though one ancestor of
each generation may have been a white person.1 73 That definition
persisted into the twentieth century, but then it was tightened. Re-
garding racial attitudes among white southerners, historian Joel Wil-
liamson has written of a growing horror at the specter of "invisible
blackness" and a growing "passion for racial purity.' 74 He concludes
that "[t]he animus against miscegenation and mulattoes seemed to
reach a crescendo in the South about 1907,'1 75 and indeed the "third
generation" definition of mulatto persisted in Alabama only until the
Code of 1907, which changed it to reach the fifth generation. 76 Thus,
the one-eighth fraction of the previous half-century was abandoned in
favor of one part in thirty-two.
Meanwhile, however, the definition for purposes of determining
miscegenation remained at one-eighth.177 In 1927, the Alabama legis-
172. For a survey of miscegenation cases in Alabama, Virginia, and indeed all the other
states, see Martyn, supra note 3.
173. AI. CODE § 4 (1852).
174. WILLIAMSON, supra note 18, at 103-08.
175. Id. at 94.
176. The Code notes: "'Fifth' substituted for 'third' by Code Committee." ALA. CODE § 2
(1907).
177. ALA. CODE § 7421 (1907). As late as the mid-1920s, therefore, as the Alabama Court of
Appeals observed, "In the sense ... that it is criminal for an octoroon and a white person to
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lature-white legislators representing white constituents-moved ag-
gressively to change the racial boundary and apply the new definition
to marriage. One 1927 law made the definition of a white person in
Alabama more exclusive than ever before. Scrapping the one-eighth
rule, scrapping even the one-thirty-second rule, it stipulated that a
"negro" was a person "descended on the part of the father or mother
from negro ancestors, without reference to or limit of time or number
of generations removed."'1 78 Another statute applied the new lan-
guage to miscegenation. "If any white person and any negro, or the
descendant of any negro intermarry, or live in adultery or fornication
with each other, each of them must, on conviction, be imprisoned in
the penitentiary for not less than two nor more than seven years."'1 79
In 1927, at last, the Alabama legislature had completed its work in
defining the races and in banning marriage between them. Marital
Apartheid in Alabama had been fully realized.
Meantime, the Virginia legislature, too, had been at work. A
1910 law redefined the races by adjusting the boundary that separated
white from black. The new law left the definition of an Indian un-
changed-"every person not a colored person" who had "one-fourth
or more of Indian blood." But from then on, the statute insisted,
"Every person having one-sixteenth or more of negro blood shall be
deemed a colored person .... ,,180
Virginia echoed Alabama in shifting by two generations the mini-
mal requirements for being defined as white. At about the same time
that Alabama moved from a one-eighth fraction to one-thirty-second,
Virginia's quest for racial purity took it from a one-fourth fraction to
one-sixteenth. Under the nineteenth-century rule of one-fourth, three
full-blooded white grandparents sufficed to make a person white only
if the fourth grandparent were part Indian or part white. Under a
intermarry, an octoroon is a negro." Weaver v. State, 116 So. 893, 895 (Ala. Ct. App. 1928).
Someone one-eighth black could not marry a "white person" without becoming subject to a
felony conviction, but a fraction black less than one-eighth put the couple beyond the reach of
the antimiscegenation statute: "After the limit of the octoroon is passed, there can be no prose-
cution, although the marriage is not legal." it
178. Act of Sept. 6, 1927, No. 626, § 5, 1927 Ala. Acts 716, 717. One outcome was a court
decision that some students, though formerly defined as white, would now have to go to the local
black school. State ex rel. Farmer v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 114 So. 575, 576 (Ala. 1933). For a
discussion of the emergence and implications of the "one drop rule" in the United States, see F.
JAMES DAVIS, WHO Is BLACK? ONE NATION's DEFI NION (1991).
179. Act of Aug. 2,1927, No. 214, 1927 Ala. Acts 219 (amending § 5001 of the Code of 1923).
The editor of the Alabama Code of 1940 noted that one drop of negro blood seemed to be
sufficient to create the offense of miscegenation, when there is marriage, adultery or fornication.




one-eighth rule, seven of eight great-grandparents would have been
required in addition to whatever margin the eighth could offer. Now
fifteen white great-grandparents out of sixteen would fail to satisfy the
definition of a white person unless the sixteenth could help out by
being part white. The intent, of course, was to make the definition of
a white person more exclusive, making it ever more difficult for a per-
son of both African and European ancestry to qualify for marriage to
someone who satisfied the more rigid requirement as a white
person. 181
The practical significance of Virginia's new law could be con-
founding and threatening. A mixed-race person who, under the previ-
ous law, could marry only a white person-barred from marrying a
"colored person" under penalty of indictment for a felony-could
now marry only another person of color and, if marrying a white per-
son, would be subject to prosecution for that choice. Two mixed-race
people who, under the previous dispensation, might have legally mar-
ried each other as white people (if, for example, each were seven-
eighths European and one-eighth African), might now marry each
other just as legally as nonwhite people. Finally, two mixed-race
Virginians who could not have married across the previous barrier-
for example, if one had one-fourth and the other only one-eighth Afri-
can ancestry-might now legally marry each other. Genealogical tests
to determine who could marry whom had taken on even greater com-
plexity than in the past.
Even the Supreme Court of Appeals may have suffered confusion
under the 1910 law. 182 A white woman, Lucy May, had married a
white man, I. B. Grasty, and borne two white children, Madeline and
Ruby. After Grasty died, she and John Moon went to Washington,
D.C., and married there. Moon was one-sixteenth African; he quali-
fied as "white" under the "one-quarter rule" but could not meet the
new racial standard. Authorities subsequently challenged her right to
retain custody of her children; now that she was involved in an interra-
cial marriage, the children would be associating with "persons of
mixed blood" and "would be deterred from association with gentle
people of white blood."'81 3 The trial court ordered their removal to
the Children's Home Society, which was required by law to take into
custody all children found to be living in "vicious or unsalutary sur-
181. Regarding twentieth-century definitions of race for purposes of regulating marriage, see
Paul Finkelman, The Color of Law, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 937, 955 n.96 (1993).
182. Moon v. Children's Home Soc'y of Virginia, 72 S.E. 707 (Va. 1911).
183. ld. at 741.
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roundings."'18 4 Speaking for a unanimous state supreme court, Judge
John Alexander Buchanan recognized and reported all this but de-
clined to recognize that the case at hand might meet that standard.
He overruled the trial court and left the children with their mother.
As Judge Buchanan concluded his opinion, "It is not pretended in this
case that the step-father was a colored person within the meaning of
our statute, or that he and the mother of the children were guilty of
any crime in intermarrying, or were not persons of good character."'185
After the 1910 statute, the Virginia legislature further redefined
race in the Old Dominion. In 1924 it passed "[a]n act to preserve
racial integrity" that, with racial intermarriage in mind, required all
Virginians to register their racial identities with a local registrar as
well as with the state registrar of vital statistics. The process was cum-
bersome and designed to be fail-safe. Any trace of nonwhite ancestry
whatever meant that a person was defined as nonwhite and thus inca-
pable of marrying someone who still qualified as white. The sole ex-
ception related to the Pocahontas defense, the fact that a number of
"white" Virginians had long admitted, even celebrated, their descent
from the seventeenth-century union between Pocahontas and John
Rolfe. Any otherwise white Virginian, if possessing no more than
one-sixteenth Indian ancestry-and no African ancestry-would still
qualify as a "white person."'186
The 1924 statute did not specify any races other than "white,"
"negro," and "Indian." Legislators' central concern, after all, related
to European and African ancestry, but the exclusive language also
brought Asians into the binary world of Virginia's racial laws, and it
placed Asians on the nonwhite side of the racial boundary. Thus, a
"white" person and someone of Asian birth or ancestry could no
longer marry each other under Virginia law.'8 7 This aspect of the new
law led to litigation in the 1950s and early 1960s.
The 1924 law redefined race as it related to marriage but other-
wise left interracial marriage as it had been since 1878, a crime carry-
ing a penitentiary sentence of two to five years. The 1932 legislature
changed that, by declaring the crime a felony with a penitentiary sen-
184. Id.
185. Id. at 708.
186. Act of Mar. 20, 1924, ch. 371, § 5, 1924 Ala. Acts 534, 535 (preserving racial integrity).
187. See Wadlington, supra note 91, at 1200-03. If Virginia was not intentionally targeting
Asians in 1924, Congress that year certainly was in the Immigration Act of 1924, which has also
been called the Oriental Exclusion Act. See DAVID M. REIMERS, STILL THE GOLDEN DOOR:
THE TiuRD WORLD COMES TO AMERICA 4-7 (1985).
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tence of one to five years. 188 The new minimum sentence remained in
effect when the Lovings encountered it in 1959.
IX. ALABAMA AND VIRGINIA FROM THE 1920s
THROUGH THE 1940s
Alabama produced more antimiscegenation litigation than any
other American state in the first half of the twentieth century.189 This
appears to have resulted less from a greater incidence of miscegena-
tion in that state than from a combination of zealous prosecution by
authorities and eager conviction by juries. 19 A number of people ap-
pealed their convictions, and as often as not, the state appeals
courts-the Alabama Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals (a
twentieth-century appellate court below the Alabama Supreme
Court)-reversed the convictions and remanded the cases on grounds
of insufficient evidence or flawed procedures. 19' Frequently, however,
the appeals courts sustained the convictions, and surely many were
never appealed.
During that period, moreover, the appeals courts maintained con-
structions of Alabama's antimiscegenation laws that fostered convic-
tions. In affirming a conviction in Lewis v. State, for example, the
Court of Appeals observed, "As has been stated many times before,"
no testimony was required by witnesses who had seen the defendants
"actually engage in sexual intercourse"; all that was required was that
the jury be "satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that there was an act
of sexual intercourse and an agreement between the parties, either
express or implied, that they would continue the relation when the
occasion offered or they so desired."'192 Yet, the court did hold to that
standard, as when it reversed the conviction of Alexander Markos, "a
Greek woman," where the prosecutor had insisted in court, and the
judge had agreed, that "[tihe only issue is whether or not he [Markos'
co-defendant] had intercourse with this woman and whether or not
she is a white woman and he is a negro"' 93 The Court of Appeals
insisted instead that there be evidence of "cohabitation,"
some living together in a state of adultery or fornication. Just one
act, or [even] the occasional act, without the intention to live to-
188. Act of Mar. 2, 1932, ch. 78, 1932 Va. Acts 68 (amending and re-enacting § 4546).
189. Martyn, supra note 3, at 1093.
190. Id. at 1093, 1126, 1129.
191. See id. at 952-55, 1093-1100, 1124-35.
192. Lewis v. State, 89 So. 904, 905 (Ala. Ct. App. 1921).
193. Jackson v. State, 129 So. 306, 306-07 (Ala. Ct. App. 1930).
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gether in a state of adultery or fornication, would not make out the
offense. It is a question of intention. One act would be sufficient if
they intended to live together, but there must be some evidence to
show that.
In this case, the evidence showed the opposite. 194
The appeals courts even tightened the application of the Ala-
bama statutes. In the 1920s, the prevailing rule held that, in a misce-
genation trial, if the jury acquitted one defendant, it must acquit the
other as well, as the Court of Appeals held in Reed v. State.'95 In
Jackson v. State, the court retained that rule, which embodied the
spirit of "equal" treatment that the supreme courts of both Alabama
and the United States had articulated in the 1880s in Pace v. Alabama:
the offense "is necessarily the act of two persons, and, on the trial of
both, a verdict of guilty as to one only cannot be sustained,. . . for
from the very nature of the offense charged both defendants are
equally guilty or equally innocent."'196 But in a later decision, Bailey
v. State, the Alabama Supreme Court overruled Reed by holding that
one defendant could be convicted even though the other was
acquitted. 97
In Virginia in the 1930s and 1940s, though apparently far less
often than in Alabama, the courts intervened to prevent couples
deemed interracial from living as husband and wife. The binary world
of two racial categories sometimes led to disputes as to who belonged
in which category. Rowena McPherson's marriage, like Isaac Jones's,
proved to be far from the only case of a Virginia couple in which the
racial identity of at least one partner was resolved in the courts. But
indictment did not necessarily lead to conviction, or at least one that
could be sustained on appeal. And people convicted in twentieth cen-
tury Virginia, unlike those in Alabama, were often permitted to es-
cape imprisonment.
The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals decided one such case in
1935. Bascomb Keith had married Reda Baker in Russell County.
Both had identified themselves as white at the time of their marriage.
Then, on the charge that Keith had "traceable colored blood," both
were indicted, convicted, and sentenced to the penitentiary for the
crime of marrying across race lines. The genealogical exercise at issue
purported to identify a man named Pat Keith as a person of color who
194. Id. at 307.
195. Reed v. State, 103 So. 97 (Ala. Ct. App. 1925).
196. Jackson, 129 So. at 306-07.
197. Bailey v. State, 193 So. 871 (Ala. Ct. App.); affd, 193 So. 873 (Ala. 1939).
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was Bascomb Keith's maternal grandfather. The state's high court
overturned the convictions:
As in all criminal trials, the burden in this case was upon the Com-
monwealth to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Pat Keith had
negro blood and also that he was the grandfather of the accused,
Bascomb Keith.... The cases are remanded to the lower court with
directions to dismiss the indictments unless the Commonwealth can
produce other and stronger evidence.198
On occasion in the 1930s and the 1940s, as before, other cases
alleging interracial marriages came before the lower courts of Vir-
ginia. Such cases, because they were not appealed, cannot be traced
by resorting to the reported cases that reached the state's highest
court, but they nonetheless occurred. Three cases illustrate how the
law of race and marriage operated in Virginia in the late 1930s and
1940s.
A 1938 case that arose in Fincastle, Virginia, offers one example.
In 1937, Grace Mohler, age 19, married Samuel Christian Branaham,
age 26. Both were later indicted for violating the state's ban on inter-
racial marriages. She escaped conviction when she testified that she
had not known that he was of African descent. He testified that he
was not of mixed race, but other testimony contradicted him. Some
witnesses stated that his family "came from Amherst County, where
they lived to themselves, even today, and were colloquially known as
'issues. '"'199 The sheriff from Amherst County, A. B. Watts, informed
the court that the Branahams "of his county once were forced out of
membership in a white church because they were of Negro extract."2°°
And birth certificates for some of Branaham's alleged kinsmen desig-
nated them as nonwhite. Clearly Branaham had considerable Euro-
pean ancestry-perhaps enough to have met the nineteenth-century
definition of white-but that could offer no support to his claim in
1938 to be exempt from the ban.
Judge Benjamin Haden declared Branaham to be black, not
white, and imposed a one-year prison sentence, the shortest possible
under the law. Then the judge suspended that sentence but "stipu-
lated the suspension was to be for 30 years, revocable at any time
during that period should he again live with the woman he married or
marry another white woman."'20' Thus, as one newspaper account put
198. Keith v. Commonwealth, 181 S.E. 283, 283-84 (Va. 1935).
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it, having been "adjudged a Negro," Samuel Branaham was ordered
"never again to live with the pretty young white woman he married
here a year ago under penalty of serving a year's suspended
sentence."
20 2
Another case that arose in western Virginia is equally illuminat-
ing. Clark Council Hamilton and Florence Madelon Hammond ob-
tained a marriage license in Salem on May 22, 1948. The pastor of the
Riverdale Baptist Church, Rev. K. A. Painter, married them the same
day. Hamilton claimed to be 22 years old and a native of California.
Hammond, a "19-year-old country girl," and he each claimed to be
white.203 They lived "in a white section of Roanoke for about two
months before moving to Baltimore. ' 20 4 In November, the bride's
mother obtained a warrant for the groom's arrest for the felony of
breaking Virginia's law against interracial marriage, and in December
her father filed a suit for annulment of the marriage.
By late December, Hamilton had been brought back to Roanoke
County, the scene of the alleged crime, from his new home in Mary-
land. Meanwhile, back in Baltimore, his wife, who continued to work
in a store there, answered all questions with "what do you want to
know for?" 20 5 Hamilton, never having requested bond, stayed in jail
until his trial on March 4. At that time, the Virginia prosecutor
claimed to have obtained a birth certificate for Hamilton that showed
him to be a 20-year-old native of Alabama whose race was listed as
"colored." Hamilton pled guilty and received a three-year suspended
prison sentence. Circuit Court Judge T. L. Keister asked whether he
planned to leave Virginia and was told "as soon as possible." The
newspaper reported that "the short, light-skinned Negro," when his
sentence was suspended "on good behavior," "left immediately, pre-
sumably for Baltimore. ' '2°6
Hammond, having reported marrying Hamilton "without doubt
that he was white," for that reason (like Grace Mohler) escaped being
charged for the same crime. Under Virginia law, she nonetheless had
no valid marriage. If she and he were to be husband and wife in an-
202. Id.
203. Miscegenation Case Defendant Fails to Make Bond Request, RICHMOND TIMES-DIs-
PATCH, Dec. 30, 1948, at 5 [hereinafter Miscegenation Case Defendant].
204. Salem Court Suspends Term of Negro, 20, on Race Count, RICHMOND TIMEs-DIsPATCH,
Mar. 5, 1949, at 3 [hereinafter Court Suspends Term of Negro].
205. Miscegenation Case Defendant, supra note 203, at 5.
206. Court Suspends Term of Negro, supra note 204, at 3.
19941
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
other state than Virginia, they would likely have to have another cere-
mony there first.20 7
Sometimes-one time, at least-charges were brought that did
not stick. Was Willie E. Purcell white or black? A 33-year-old truck
driver living in Richmond, he married Stella May Rhoton, white, in
Richmond City Hall on December 31, 1948. The bride's mother, Ada
Rhoton, charged that he was black and that he had thus broken the
statute against miscegenation. Mrs. Rhoton had been excluded from
the wedding-her daughter, in obtaining the marriage license, had
said she was 21, she was born in Tennessee, and her parents were
dead. In fact, she was 18, born in Scott County, Virginia, and her
mother was very much alive in South Richmond. Charges were pend-
ing against the daughter for perjury. But what of Mrs. Rhoton's
charge against her putative son-in-law? At a trial in Police Court, the
evidence was mixed. An unspecified number of police records ap-
peared evenly divided as to Purcell's race, with "about half" listing
him as black and half as white. Much more conclusive were his Army
discharge papers, which indicated that he was white; his birth certifi-
cate, which listed both of his parents as white; and his father's testi-
mony that both he and Purcell's mother were white. Judge Harold C.
Maurice dismissed the case.208 The law would still deal with the bride,
who in turn would have to deal with her mother. But in this case, the
law would not separate the newlyweds on racial grounds.
X. JACKSON AND NAIM: ALABAMA AND VIRGINIA IN THE 1950s
In 1878, in the Green case, Justice Manning had pointed to two
criteria that drove the state of Alabama, under white control, to man-
date antimiscegenation policies-"the relative proportions and condi-
tion of the two races." By 1950, the black percentage of Alabama's
population had dropped from 48 percent to 32 percent and was still
declining. Similarly, census data indicated that the nonwhite propor-
tion (however defined) of Virginia's population dropped from 42 per-
cent in the 1870s to 22 percent in 1950.209 In both states, of course,
slavery receded ever farther into the past. But the policy of prohibit-
ing interracial marriages persisted, along with its enforcement.
207. Id.
208. Miscegenation Charge Here is Dismissed, RICHMOND TIMEs-DISPATCH, Feb. 4, 1949, at
2.
209. THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SouTHERN HISTORY, supra note 22, at 31, 1295.
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As late as the 1950s, miscegenation cases continued to come
before the Alabama Court of Appeals, and they demonstrated the
continuing impossibility of securing change in the courts. A black wo-
man named Linnie Jackson was convicted for her miscegenous rela-
tionship with a white man named A. C. Burcham. E. B. Haltom, Jr.,
her lawyer, relying on a long train of twentieth-century civil rights de-
cisions from the U.S. Supreme Court, challenged the proceeding on
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment grounds. Nonetheless, the Ala-
bama Court of Appeals surveyed the history of decisions in miscege-
nation cases in the Alabama courts, declared that the nation's high
court had affirmed the Pace decision, and noted that "the decisions of
the [Alabama] Supreme Court shall govern the holdings and decisions
of this court." It upheld her conviction.2
10
Jackson did not give up. She took her case to the Alabama
Supreme Court, which rebuffed her as well,211 and then to the U.S.
Supreme Court. There she found that the justices were by no means
eager to push an equal-rights agenda on the matter of miscegenation.
Focused as they were on the school segregation cases that had been
decided in 1954, they recognized that, were they to take on miscegena-
tion, they might only get in their own way.2 12 The first decision an-
nounced in Brown v. Board of Education came in May 1954; the
second, implementing decision came in May 1955. Linnie Jackson's
case came to the Court in between those two dates.213
Early writers surmised that, as one put it, though "[t]here is no
doubt that these statutes are unconstitutional," "the Court, or at least
some of its Justices, did not believe that airing this inflammatory sub-
ject, of little practical significance, would be in the public interest
while strident opposition is being voiced to less controversial desegre-
gation because it allegedly leads to intermarriage. '214 The papers of
various Supreme Court justices now make it clear that such specula-
tions were exactly right.
Harvey M. Grossman, law clerk to Justice William 0. Douglas,
expressed his conflicted response when advising his boss on the Jack-
210. Jackson v. State, 72 So.2d 114 (Ala. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 72 So.2d 116 (Ala. 1954).
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.; Jackson v. Alabama, 348 U.S. 888 (1954); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954); Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955). For more detailed analysis see Chang M.
Sohn, Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review: Miscegenation Cases in the Supreme Court,
70-73 (1970) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University); and Martyn, supra note 3,
at 1247-49.
214. JACK GREENBERG, RACE RELATIONS AND AMERICAN LAW 345 (1959). See also WAL-
TER F. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY 192-93 (1964).
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son case. "It seems clear that the statute involved is unconstitutional,"
he wrote on November 3, 1954. And yet, he continued,
review at the present time would probably increase the tensions
growing out of the school segregation cases and perhaps impede so-
lution to that problem, and therefore the Court may wish to defer
action until a future time. Nevertheless, I believe that[,] since the
deprivation of rights involved here has such serious consequences to
the petitioner and others similarly situated[,] review is probably
warranted even though action might be postponed until the school
segregation problem is solved.
215
Later that month, the Supreme Court dodged the bullet. With no
indication of dissent, it denied certiorari.216 Seven decades had
elapsed from one miscegenation case to another before the Court, and
nothing, it seemed, had changed. The precedent, such as it was, in
Pace remained intact. Linnie Jackson went to the penitentiary. And
the next year, the Court dodged another such case, one that came
from Virginia. 21
7
On June 26, 1952, Ham Say Naim, a Chinese sailor, married a
white woman from Virginia in Elizabeth City, North Carolina. That
state, unlike Virginia, permitted marriages between Caucasians and
Asians, though not between whites and blacks.218 For some months
the Naims made their home in Norfolk, Virginia. Then they sepa-
rated. On September 30, 1953, Ruby Elaine Naim filed a petition
seeking annulment on grounds of adultery, and if that effort failed,
she asked that an annulment be granted on the basis of Virginia's ban
on interracial marriages.
21 9
Judge Floyd E. Kellam of the Portsmouth Circuit Court knew an
easy case when he saw one. Here was a marriage between a white
215. Memorandum from Harvey M. Grossman, law clerk, to Justice William 0. Douglas
(Nov. 3, 1954) (on file with Justice William 0. Douglas Papers, Box 1156, Library of Congress).
For a related observation that, given the furor in the South over Brown v. Board of Education,
"the last thing in the world the Justices wanted to deal with at that time was the question of
interracial marriage," see Philip Elman, The Solicitor General's Office, Justice Frankfurter, and
Civil Rights Litigation, 1946-1960: An Oral History, 100 HARV. L. REv. 817, 845-47 (1987).
216. Jackson, 348 U.S. 888.
217. Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 891 (1955); Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 985 (1956); Sohn, supra note
213, at 73-94.
218. The North Carolina state constitution, a relic of Reconstruction, retained an 1875
amendment declaring that "All marriages between a white person and a negro, or between a
white person and a person of negro descent to the third generation, inclusive, are hereby forever
prohibited." N.C. CONST. of 1943, art. XIV, § 8. The North Carolina Code applied the ban to
people one-eighth Native American as well, but the legislature had never reached beyond those
groups in the way that Virginia, by implication, had beginning in 1924. N.C. Code of 1943, ch.
51, art. 1, §§ 51-53.
219. Racial Intermarriage Case Faces High Court, RICHMOND TIMEs-DISPATcH, Oct. 7, 1964,
at 2; State's High Court Spurns U.S. Order, RICHMOND TIMES-DIsPATCH, Jan. 19, 1956, at 1.
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person and a nonwhite. The couple had gone to North Carolina in
order to evade the Virginia law. Of course, the marriage was void and
he granted the annulment. 220
Now it was Mr. Naim's turn to go to court. On the basis of his
marriage to an American citizen, he had applied for an immigrant
visa, and unless he remained married he could not hope to be success-
ful. His immigration attorney, David Carliner, had his own reasons
for challenging the constitutionality of Virginia's antimiscegenation
statute. He and Naim mounted a test case. They challenged the cir-
cuit court's decision on the grounds that the Fourteenth Amendment
overrode the Virginia statute.221
Speaking for a unanimous Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals,
Justice Archibald Chapman Buchanan relied on the Tenth Amend-
ment to fend off the Fourteenth. "Regulation of the marriage rela-
tion," he insisted, "is ... distinctly one of the rights guaranteed to the
States and safeguarded by that bastion of States' rights, somewhat bat-
tered perhaps but still a sturdy fortress in our fundamental law, the
tenth section of the Bill of Rights. '222
What about Brown v. Board of Education and its incantation of
the Equal Protection Clause? No problem, Justice Buchanan assured
Virginia authorities. "No such claim for the intermarriage of the races
could be supported; by no sort of valid reasoning could it be found to
be a foundation of good citizenship or a right which must be made
available to all on equal terms.' ' 223 He could find nothing in the U.S.
Constitution, he wrote, that would "prohibit the State from enacting
legislation to preserve the racial integrity of its citizens, or which de-
nies the power of the State to regulate the marriage relation so that it
shall not have a mongrel breed of citizens. ' 224 Rather than promote
good citizenship, he suggested, "the obliteration of racial pride" and
"the corruption of blood" would "weaken or destroy the quality of its
citizenship. 225
220. Virginia Ban on Racial Intermarriages is Upheld, RICHMOND TIMES-DIsPATCH, June 14,
1955, at 5.
221. Sohn, supra note 213, at 73-88.
222. Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d 749, 755 (Va. 1955). Since 1928, members of Virginia's state
supreme court have carried the title "Justice" rather than "Judge" and "Chief Justice" rather
than "President." VA. CONST. art. VI, § 88 (amended June 19, 1928). In 1971, Virginia's
Supreme Court of Appeals was renamed the Virginia Supreme Court. VA. CONST. of 1971, art.
VI, § 1.
223. Naim, 87 S.E.2d at 754.




Refusing to give up, Naim appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.
Unfortunately for Naim, his case came to the Supreme Court only one
year after Jackson, and the Court was no more eager to confront the
issue then than it had been the year before. John Marshall Harlan, a
recent appointee to the nation's high bench, brought a tormented
mind and a tortured prose to the task of writing a formal statement
that he wished to read in conference on November 5, 1955, regarding
the case from Virginia. He spoke of "moral considerations," which he
proceeded to identify as "of course, those raised by the bearing of
adjudicating this question to the Court's responsibility in not thwart-
ing or seriously handicapping the enforcement of its decision in the
segregation cases. '226 He felt certain, he said, that every member of
the Court agreed with him that "to throw a decision of this Court
other than validating this legislation into the vortex of the present dis-
quietude would ... seriously, I believe very seriously, embarrass the
carrying out of the Court's decree of last May. '227
The Court neither accepted nor refused the case. Rather, it sent
the case back to Virginia. Determining the record insufficiently clear
or complete to address the question Naim raised, it directed the Vir-
ginia Supreme Court of Appeals to remand the case to Portsmouth for
further proceedings. 228 But that state's highest court refused to coop-
erate with the high court's request-or, rather, it acted to help the
high court out of its dilemma. It remonstrated that
the record before the Circuit Court of the City of Portsmouth was
adequate for a decision of the issues presented to it. The record
before this court was adequate for deciding the issues on review....
The decree of the trial court and the decree of this court affirming it
have become final so far as these courts are concerned. 229
The Virginia statutes were sound, the Naims' marriage was void, and
the Virginia courts' decisions were final, said the court.
We have no provision either under the rules of practice of this court
or under the statute law of this Commonwealth by which this court
may send the cause back to the Circuit Court with directions to reo-
pen the cause so decided, gather additional evidence and render a
new decision. Indeed, such action would be contrary to our fixed
rules of practice and procedure and our statute law. 230
226. Memorandum from Justice Harlan to other Supreme Court Justices (Nov. 4, 1955)
(John Marshall Harlan Papers, Box 11, Mudd Library, Princeton University).
227. Id.
228. Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 891 (1955).
229. Naim v. Naim, 90 S.E.2d 849, 850 (Va. 1956).
230. Id. (internal citations omitted).
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The Richmond Times-Dispatch published an editorial about the
standoff. While acknowledging that the Virginia court had "used
some rather tart language in refusing to comply," it insisted nonethe-
less that "the Virginia court has not defied the nation's highest tribu-
nal." Rather, the paper noted that the state court had simply declared
that "it had no legal means of conniving with the Federal court's or-
der." Noting many Virginians' displeasure with the Supreme Court's
recent rulings on segregation, the editorial observed that those
"[m]any Virginians ... also applaud the Virginia court in rebuffing the
Federal court's attempt to operate in an area of State affairs over
which it has no jurisdiction. '231
Naim took his case back to the Supreme Court, but there it died.
The Court simply noted that the response of the Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals "leaves the case devoid of a properly presented Fed-
eral question." The Virginia court had helped take the U.S. Supreme
Court off the hook.232 No judicial reconsideration took place in the
1950s regarding Alabama's or Virginia's antimiscegenation laws.
During the interlude between the Naim and Loving cases, an-
other case regarding interracial marriage went to trial and then to Vir-
ginia's highest court. In 1962, the Virginia Supreme Court upheld a
lowercourt ruling that a white woman and a Filipino man ("a member
of the Malayan race") who had been married in New Jersey had no
valid marriage in Virginia, and thus could not obtain a divorce in that
state.233 A member of the U.S. armed forces, Cesar Calma had relo-
cated to Virginia under military orders, and his case caused great con-
cern among similar families in the Norfolk area. Authorities had taken
no action against the couple, and, as in the case of the Naims, their
marriage had come into the courts only through their own actions.
Nonetheless, if no marriage of an Asian-white couple could be valid,
then that carried ominous implications regarding such matters as in-
heritance and adoption, and it left open the threat of prosecution for
231. Virginia's Top Tribunal Rejects Order of U.S. Supreme Court, RicHMoNo TiMES-DIS-
PATCH, Jan. 19, 1956, at 12.
232. Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 985 (1956); High Court Shelves Plea By Seaman, RICHMOND
TIMEs-DISPATCH, Mar. 13, 1956, at 3. See Wadlington, supra note 91, at 1210-12. For further
discussion, see Martyn, supra note 3, at 1231-38.
233. Calma v. Calma, 128 S.E.2d 440 (Va. 1962). For a discussion, see Martyn, supra note 3,
at 1239-40. The appellate decision hinged on procedural considerations, but the outcome at the
trial level made it clear that the 1924 legislation applied fully to nonwhites, even if not of African
ancestry, if they had marriages with white residents of Virginia, even if those marriages had been




living together outside of marriage.234 It could not be said of the
Calmas that they had gone out of Virginia for the purpose of getting
married and with the intent to return to live together, all to evade the
Virginia statute. Nonetheless, under Virginia law they had no
marriage.
XI. THE NEW FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT OF THE 1960s:
MCLAUGHLIN AND THE LoVINGS
In the 1960s, the U.S. Supreme Court displayed a new willingness
to take on the issue of miscegenation. Recovering from the paralysis
it had suffered in the mid-1950s, the Court now drove toward utter
demolition of the structure of Jim Crow in American public life-and
thus in private life as well. In the Pace decision eighty years before,
the Court had unblinkingly upheld Alabama's antimiscegenation law.
In the 1950s, it had refused to deal with the question. In 1964, the
Court began to confront it.
In a case that came from Florida, McLaughlin v. Florida, the
Court ruled unanimously that the State could not use a miscegenation
statute to prosecute an interracial pair for "habitually liv[ing] in and
occupy[ing] in the nighttime the same room .... -235 A unanimous
Court rejected the use of racial classification in this manner.2 36 Justice
Byron White argued that "the central purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment was to eliminate racial discrimination emanating from
offical sources in the States. '2
37
It was a crucial decision because the Court overturned the Pace
precedent. Yet, the Court sidestepped the central question. Plaintiffs
and state alike attempted to tie together Florida's laws against interra-
cial nonmarital cohabitation and interracial marriage, the plaintiffs on
the basis that marriage was not an option available to them,238 the
state on the grounds that the "interracial cohabitation law... is ancil-
lary to and serves the same purpose as the miscegenation law it-
self."'239 Writing for the Court, Justice White insisted on untying the
two bans: "We reject [the State's] argument, without reaching the
question of the validity of the State's prohibition against interracial
marriage or the soundness of the arguments rooted in the history of
234. See Wadlington, supra note 91, at 1206; Arness, supra note 91, at 72-74.
235. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
236. Id. at 197 (Harlan, J., concurring); id at 198 (Stewart & Douglas, J.J., concurring).
237. Id. at 192.
238. Id. at 187.
239. Id. at 195.
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the [Fourteenth] Amendment." 240 Thus, the Justices invalidated the
statute under which the pair had been convicted, but they took pains
to make explicit that they did so "without expressing any views about
the state's prohibition of interracial marriage .... "241
Finally, in 1967, in another unanimous decision, Loving v. Vir-
ginia, the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated the Virginia miscegenation
statutes. And it did so in language designed to strike down all such
legislation in every state. Basing the decision on due process as well
as equal protection grounds, Chief Justice Earl Warren directed the
Fourteenth Amendment against anti-miscegenation laws. "The Four-
teenth Amendment requires that the freedom of choice to marry not
be restricted by invidious racial discriminations. Under our Constitu-
tion, the freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of another race
resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by the State. '242
He concluded: "These convictions must be reversed. ' 243 Justice Potter
Stewart, as he had in the McLaughlin case, went even farther in a
concurring opinion. He argued that "it is simply not possible for a
state law to be valid under our Constitution which makes the criminal-
ity of an act depend upon the race of the actor."'244
XII. MR. AND MRS. LOVING VERSUS THE STATE OF VIRGINIA
On July 11, 1958, Caroline County Commonwealth's Attorney
Bernard Mahon obtained warrants for the arrest of Richard Loving
and "Mildred Jeter" each for a felony associated with their marriage
on June 2 in Washington, D.C.245 Late at night, three law officers en-
tered the Lovings' bedroom with their flashlights, awakened them,
and arrested them for living together as husband and wife.246 The
grand jury brought indictments at its October term. At their trial on
January 6, 1959, they pled "not guilty" and waived a jury trial. At the
close of argument, however, they changed their pleas to "guilty." Cir-
240. Id.
241. Id. at 196. For greater detail and further analysis, see Wadlington, supra note 91, at
1219-22; Sohn, supra note 213, at 94-107; Martyn, supra note 3, at 1268-79; and CURRME, supra
note 87, at 416.
242. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). Here the Chief Justice relied on a series of
cases beginning in 1923. For a discussion of the right to privacy and the freedom to marry, see
infra note 264.
243. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
244. Id. (quoting McLaughlin v. Florida, 579 U.S. 184, 198 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
For more detail and analysis, see Sohn, supra note 213, at 107-120; Martyn, supra note 3, at 1298-
1320; and ROBERT J. SicKELs, RACE, MARRIAGE, AND THE LAW 1-3, 76-91, 104-110 (1972).
245. Record at 1, Loving v. Virginia, No. 6163 (Va. 1965) (Commonwealth warrant).
246. Interview with Mildred Loving, Defendant (Jan. 7, 1994).
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cuit Court Judge Leon M. Bazile sentenced each of them to one year
in jail, but suspended the sentences "for a period of twenty-five years"
provided that "both accused leave Caroline County and the state of
Virginia at once and do not return together or at the same time to said
county and state for a period of twenty-five years. '247
As earlier Virginia cases suggest-such as those of Samuel Chris-
tian Branaham and of Clark Council Hamilton-this approach to such
cases was typical in the Old Dominion in the mid-twentieth century,
though the details of a suspended sentence, with or without banish-
ment, varied. Judge Bazile imposed the lightest sentence that the law
allowed (from one to five years). In the face of a statute that specified
that the sentence was to be served in the penitentiary, he sentenced
them to jail. Then, he suspended the sentence for a period of many
years. The Lovings could not live as husband and wife in Virginia, and
they would not be raising their mixed-race children in Virginia. The
finite suspension did not even mean that, after twenty-five years, the
Lovings could move back to Virginia. One of them, it seemed, could
live in Virginia with impunity. Or, after twenty-five years, both could
live there separately. But, even after twenty-five years, if they at-
tempted to live together in their native state, both would again face
prosecution.
Thus, Richard Loving and Mildred Jeter, as the Virginia court
knew them, moved to Washington, D.C., and resumed their identities
as Mr. and Mrs. Loving. There, they lived at 1151 Neal Street North-
east with Mrs. Loving's cousin, Alex Byrd, and his wife Laura.248
Over the next few years, they had three children: Sidney, Donald, and
Peggy.249 Though either Mr. Loving or Mrs. Loving could visit Caro-
line County, they could not both do so at the same time. They had to
make their home and find employment outside the state. They did so
for more than four years.
But then they began to contest their situation. In 1963, Mildred
Loving wrote Robert F. Kennedy, Attorney General of the United
States, for assistance. The Justice Department redirected the letter to
the National Capitol Area Civil Liberties Union with the suggestion
that, though the government could not help the Lovings, perhaps the
247. Record at 4, Loving, No. 6163 (Va. 1958).
248. Interview with Mildred Loving, Defendant (Jan. 4, 1994); POLK'S WASHINGTON CrrY
DIRECTORY 226, 950 (1962).
249. The Crime of Being Married, LwnE, Mar. 18, 1966, at 85-91.
[Vol. 70:371
RACE, MARRIAGE, AND THE LAW OF FREEDOM
American Civil Liberties Union could. The ACLU did.250 And thus
the Lovings' case made its way back into the courts. While it was
pending, the Lovings returned home to Caroline County, where they
faced uncertainty, but kept their Washington, D.C., sanctuary at the
ready.25
1
ACLU member Bernard S. Cohen, a young lawyer practicing in
Alexandria, Virginia, welcomed an opportunity to take the case. In
November 1963, he went to state court seeking reconsideration of the
Lovings' convictions and sentences. He filed a motion in Caroline
County Circuit Court to set aside the original judgment. Nothing hap-
pened; Judge Bazile was in no hurry to second-guess himself. Another
young attorney, Philip J. Hirschkop, joined Cohen in the case, and in
October 1964 they began a class action in U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia. 252 They requested that a three-judge
court convene to determine the constitutionality of Virginia's antimis-
cegenation statutes and to enjoin the enforcement of the Lovings'
convictions under those laws. Pending a decision by a three-judge
panel, Cohen and Hirschkop requested a temporary injunction to pre-
vent the enforcement of those laws, which they said were designed
"solely for the purpose of keeping the Negro people in the badges and
bonds of slavery. ' 253 Seeing no "irreparable harm" to the Lovings in
the meantime, District Judge John D. Butzner, Jr., rejected the mo-
tion.254 Then, with the federal panel due to meet soon, Judge Bazile
finally brought the case back to trial.255
Cohen and Hirschkop knew that they would have to be creative
to overturn a century's worth of adverse precedents. Of course they
would rely on the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause
to contest the constitutionality of Virginia's antimiscegenation stat-
utes. Citing George Mason's Declaration of Rights from 1776, they
also argued that the suspended sentence "denie[d] the right of mar-
riage which is a fundamental right of free men." They argued that the
sentence constituted "cruel and unusual punishment" in violation of
the Virginia Constitution; that it exceeded the "reasonable period of
250. Anti-Miscegenation Case Move Rejected, RIcHMOND NEWS LEADER, Oct. 29, 1964, at
21. At the time, no Virginia ACLU affiliate yet existed.
251. Interview with Mildred Loving, Defendant (Jan. 7, 1994). They are listed as late as 1967
as living at the home of Alex Byrd. POLK'S WASHINTON CITY DIRECrORY 827 (1967).
252. Interview with Bernard S. Cohen, Attorney for the Lovings (Jan. 4, 1994); Interview
with Philip J. Hirschkop, Attorney for the Lovings (Aug. 18, 1994).
253. Pair Files Suit to End State Ban, RICHMOND NEWS LEADER, Oct. 28, 1964, at 23.
254. Anti-Miscegenation Case Move Rejected, supra note 250, at 21; Couple Begins Legal
Attack on Mixed-Marriage Law, N.Y. TrmEs, Oct. 29, 1964, at 26.
255. Mixed-Marriage Ban is Fought in Virginia, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1964, at 35.
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suspension" permitted by Virginia law; and that it constituted banish-
ment in violation of due process.256
In January 1965, six years after the original proceedings, Judge
Bazile presided over a hearing of the Lovings' petition to have his
decision set aside. In a written opinion, he rebutted each of the con-
tentions that might have forced a reconsideration of their guilt. Citing
Kinney v. Commonwealth, for example, Judge Bazile noted that the
Lovings' marriage was "absolutely void in Virginia," and that they
could not "cohabit" there "without incurring repeated prosecutions"
for doing so.257 Referring to the Virginia high court's decision in
Naim, he noted that marriage was "a subject which belongs to the
exclusive control of the States. '258 In fact, he noted, quoting an 1871
Indiana Supreme Court decision on interracial marriage, "If the fed-
eral government can determine who may marry in a state, there is no
limit to its power. ' 259 As for antimiscegenation statutes, he cited the
federal precedent in Pace as well as the Supreme Court's denial of
certiorari in Jackson even after Brown v. Board of Education as sup-
port for their continued validity.
By way of conclusion, Judge Bazile wrote:
Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay and
red, and he placed them on separate continents. And but for the
interference with his arrangement[,] there would be no cause for
such marriages. The fact that he separated the races shows that he
did not intend for the races to mix. 260
The three federal judges decided in February 1965 to postpone
action until the Lovings had exhausted their appeals in state court.
The office of the Virginia attorney general, Robert Y. Button, argued
that the Virginia appellate court should first rule in the case. Ac-
cepting that position, United States District Judge Oren R. Lewis, of
the Eastern District of Virginia, expressed the view that "a matter so
sensitive to the social structure of the South as is racial intermarriage
should first be ruled upon by state courts." He assumed that the case
would in fact go to the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals. If it did,
he wanted to see the main issue "squarely presented." Together with
the other judges on the panel-District Court Judge John D. Butzner,
256. Record at 5, Loving v. Virginia, No. 6163 (Va. 1965) (Motion to Vacate and Set Aside
Judgment).
257. Id. at 11.
258. Id. at 12.
259. Id. at 11-12 (quoting State v. Gibson, 36 Ind. 389, 402-03 (1871)). The Alabama
Supreme Court also relied on the Gibson case in the 1870s when determining the constitutional-
ity of its own antimiscegenation statute. Green v. State, 58 Ala. 190, 195 (1877).
260. Record at 15, Loving, No. 6163.
[Vol. 70:371
RACE, MARRIAGE, AND THE LAW OF FREEDOM
Jr., of the Eastern District and Circuit Court Judge Albert V. Bryan of
the Fourth Circuit-he promised a decision after that "as quickly as
possible." Thus the panel deferred the matter to the Virginia courts
but noted that, if they failed to move promptly, it would resume
jurisdiction.
261
The Lovings appealed Judge Bazile's decision to Virginia's high-
est court. There, lawyers for the State and the Lovings rehearsed ar-
guments that were likely to be heard again at the U.S. Supreme Court.
In mounting one of their arguments, Cohen and Hirschkop quoted the
California Supreme Court's opinion in Perez v. Sharp, the only previ-
ous successful litigation-aside from the 1872 Alabama decision in
Burns-against the constitutionality of antimiscegenation laws: "If the
right to marry is a fundamental right, then it must be conceded that an
infringement of that right by means of a racial restriction is an unlaw-
ful infringement of one's liberty. '262 They went on to assert:
The caprice of the politicians cannot be substituted for the minds of
the individual in what is man's most personal and intimate decision.
The error of such legislation must immediately be apparent to those
in favor of miscegenation statutes, if they stopped to consider their
abhorrence to a statute which commanded that "all marriages must
be between persons of different racial backgrounds.
'263
Such a statute would be no more "repugnant to the constitution"-
and no less so-than the law under consideration. Something "so per-
sonal as the choice of a mate must be left to the individuals involved,"
they argued; "race limitations are too unreasonable and arbitrary a
basis for the State to interfere.
' '264
261. Mixed Couple Case Delayed in Virginia, N.Y. TIMES Jan. 28, 1965, at 17.
262. Appellant's Petition for Writ of Error at 12, Loving v. Virginia, No. 6163 (Va. 1965)
(quoting Perez v. Sharp, 198 P.2d 17, 31 (1949)).
263. Appellant's Petition for Writ of Error at 12, Loving (No. 6163).
264. Id. The Perez decision had relied on Supreme Court rulings regarding privacy. In de-
claring that parents had the right to teach their children a foreign language, the Court had stated
that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause protected an individual's libery
to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful
knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God accord-
ing to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally, to enjoy those privileges long
recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). Another decision ruled that parents had the right
to send their children to private schools. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). By the
time the Loving case came to the Court, married people also had the right to decide whether to
use birth control information and devices to keep from having children. Griswold v. Connecti-
cut, 361 U.S. 479 (1965). For detailed histories of the right to privacy, see WILLIAM G. Ross,
FORGING NEw FREEDOMS: NATIVISM, EDUCATION, AND THE CONsTrruTION, 1917-1927 (1994);
and DAVID J. GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALry: THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE MAKING
OF Roe v. Wade (1994).
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Rejecting all of the Lovings' arguments, the court largely adopted
the brief of the State of Virginia as its opinion. 265 On March 7, 1966,
speaking for a unanimous court, Justice Harry Lee Carrico rejected
the Lovings' claim that the decision in Naim-having relied on Plessy,
since overruled in Brown, and on Pace, since overruled in McLaughlin
should not govern the case. Justice Carrico reasoned that in Brown,
the United States Supreme Court ruled that "in the field of public
education, the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place," but said
nothing that might be construed as extending to marriage. 266 Justice
Carrico was able to say that the Court itself, by denying certiorari in
the Jackson case "just six months" after Brown, "indicated that the
Brown decision does not have the effect upon miscegenation statutes
which the defendants claim for it."'267 Carrico concluded that Mc-
Laughlin "detracted not one bit from the position asserted in the
Naim opinion, '268 for the Supreme Court itself said, in deciding that
case, that it did so "without reaching the question of the validity of
[Florida's] prohibition against interracial marriage. '269
Various writings in the social and biological sciences had been
submitted for the Court's consideration urging a reversal of the Lov-
ings' convictions. Rejecting their relevance, Justice Carrico declared:
A decision by this court reversing the Naim case upon consideration
of the opinions of such text writers would be judicial legislation in
the rawest sense of that term. Such arguments are properly ad-
dressed to the legislature, which enacted the law in the first place,
and not to this court, whose prescribed role in the separated powers
of government is to adjudicate, and not to legislate.27°
It was clear where Carrico was going.
Our one and only function in this instance is to determine whether,
for sound judicial considerations, the Naim case should be reversed.
Today, more than ten years since that decision was handed down by
this court, a number of states still have miscegenation statutes and
yet there has been no new decision reflecting adversely upon the
validity of such statutes. We find no sound judicial reason, there-
fore, to depart from our holding in the Naim case. According that
decision all of the weight to which it is entitled under the doctrine of
stare decisis, we hold it to be binding upon us here .... 271
265. Loving v. Virginia, 147 S.E.2d 78 (Va. 1966).
266. Id. at 80 (quoting Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 498 (1954)).
267. I at 81.
268. Id.
269. hi at 81-82 (quoting McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 195 (1964)).
270. Id. at 82.
271. Id.
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Yet, Virginia's high court still had to address the way Judge Bazile
had handled the Lovings' sentencing when it was at trial seven years
before. Lawyers for the Lovings objected that the suspended sentence
was, in effect, banishment and that, as the North Carolina Supreme
Court had declared in 1953, "A sentence of banishment is undoubt-
edly void. ' 272 Judge Carrico differed: "Although the defendants
were, by the terms of the suspended sentences, ordered to leave the
state, their sentences did not technically constitute banishment be-
cause they were permitted to return to the state, provided they did not
return together or at the same time. ' 273 Nonetheless, Judge Bazile
had erred. The statute's purpose under which he had suspended the
sentence was "rehabilitation," and the Lovings' real offense was their
"cohabitation as man and wife" in Virginia. Thus, Judge Bazile should
have related the suspension of their sentences to their cohabitation
"as man and wife in this state," and not to their presence in Vir-
ginia.274 The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals remanded the case
to the circuit court in Caroline County, not to retry the case but
merely for resentencing. Any suspension of sentence must be on
"conditions not inconsistent with the views expressed in this opin-
ion."275 As an aside, Justice Carrico noted that "although it has not
been alluded to by either side," the statute called for "a sentence in
the penitentiary, and not in jail." 276
The Lovings had exhausted their appeals in the Virginia courts.
Their convictions remained intact. No matter what sentences the Car-
oline County court might finally impose, they still would be unable to
do what they continued to desire to do, "cohabit as man and wife" in
Virginia. Perhaps they would go to the penitentiary. New terms of
suspension might permit them to visit Virginia together. Perhaps, in
what might appear the most likely outcome, they could both live in
Virginia, but not together.
The Lovings appealed their case to the U.S. Supreme Court. Jus-
tice John Marshall Harlan's clerk pointed out to him that the "misce-
genation issue" was "left open" in McLaughlin and "appear[ed] ripe
for review here. ' 277 On December 12, 1966, the Court agreed to hear
272. State v. Doughtie, 74 S.E.2d 922, 924 (N.C. 1953).
273. Loving, 147 S.E.2d at 82.
274. Id. at 83.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Letter from Nimetz to Justice John Marshall Harlan, Supreme Court Justice (Oct. 10,
1966) (on file with John Marshall Harlan Papers, Box 285).
19941
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
the case.278 The Japanese American Citizens League submitted a
brief as friend of the court, indicating that interest in the question
went beyond black-white marriages and the law.279 In the Lovings'
brief, Cohen and Hirschkop reviewed the history of Virginia's antimis-
cegenation statutes-going all the way back to the seventeenth cen-
tury-to characterize them as "relics of slavery" and, at the same
time, "expressions of modern day racism." 280 In oral argument, on
April 10, 1967, Cohen conveyed the words of Richard Loving to sup-
port his argument. "Mr. Cohen, tell the Court I love my wife, and it is
just unfair that I can't live with her in Virginia."
'281
Two months later, on June 12, 1967, Chief Justice Earl Warren
delivered the opinion of the United States Supreme Court. According
to the Chief Justice, "This case presents a constitutional question
never addressed by this Court: whether a statutory scheme adopted by
the State of Virginia to prevent marriages between persons solely on
the basis of racial classifications violates the Equal Protection and
Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. ' '282 As the Lov-
ings' lawyers had urged, the Chief Justice leveled both clauses at the
Virginia statutes. In an unanimous decision, the statutes fell.
The Court rejected each of the State's leading contentions, as
well as each of the precedents on which the State had drawn. While
the historical record, the judicial precedents, and the legal logic of the
State's brief were incorporated into the decision of the Supreme
Court of Appeals of Virginia, those of the Lovings' brief made their
way into the decision of the United States Supreme Court. Despite
the decision of the Virginia Court of Appeals in Naim, the Tenth
Amendment yielded to the Fourteenth when it came to the claim of
"exclusive state control" over the "regulation of marriage. '283 As for
278. Supreme Court Agrees to Rule on State Miscegenation Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1966,
at 40. For a description of the case's procedural history, see Ban on Interracial Marriages Upheld
by Virginia High Court, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1966, at 26; Virginia Suit Scores Mixed Marriage
Ban, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 1966, at 9.
279. For a discussion of the briefs contents see SICKELS, supra note 244, at 85, 89.
280. Brief for Appellants at 15, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (No. 395), reprinted in
LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 91, at 741, 763.
281. Oral Argument of Philip J. Hirschkop, Esq., on behalf of Appellants at 12, Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (No. 395), reprinted in LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 91, at 959, 971.
282. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967). For an analysis of the Chief Justice's leadership
in the case, see BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF. EARL WARREN AND His SUPREME
COURT-A JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY 668-69 (1983). For another treatment, see TINSLEY E. YAR-
BROUGH, JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN: GREAT DISSENTER OF THE WARREN COURT 262, 267-69
(1992) (focusing on the McLaughlin case). Little else in judicial biography addresses the Loving
decision. See, e.g., KIM I. EISLER, A JUSTICE FOR ALlw WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR., AND THE
DECISIONS THAT TRANSFORMED AMERICA (1993).
283. Loving, 388 U.S. at 7.
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the narrow construction of the Fourteenth Amendment, dependent as
it was on the State's reading of the intent of the framers, the Court
harked back to its statement in Brown that the historical record was
"inconclusive. '"2 14 The argument that Virginia's "miscegenation stat-
utes punish equally both the white and the Negro participants in an
interracial marriage" would not pass constitutional muster in the
1960s.285 Should "this Court... defer to the wisdom of the state legis-
lature" on this matter?286 Chief Justice Warren rejected the State's
contention that "these statutes should be upheld if there is any possi-
ble basis for concluding that they serve a rational purpose."' 87 The
burden of proof rested on the state, for "the fact of equal application
does not immunize the statute from the heavy burden of justification"
required by the Fourteenth Amendment, particularly when racial clas-
sifications appeared in criminal statutes.288
The Brown decision shielded the Lovings from a narrow interpre-
tation of the intent of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, but
nothing could protect the state from the legislative history of the mis-
cegenation laws. "The fact that Virginia prohibits only interracial
marriages involving white persons demonstrates" that those laws were
"designed to maintain White Supremacy." 289 Moreover, the court's
recent decision in McLaughlin undercut the relevance of Pace. As
Chief Justice Warren now put it, "The clear and central purpose of the
Fourteenth Amendment was to eliminate all official state sources of
invidious racial discrimination in the States. '290 Quoting Justice Stew-
art's concurring opinion in the McLaughlin case, in which Justice
Douglas had joined, the Chief Justice wrote: "Indeed, two members of
this Court have already stated that they 'cannot conceive of a valid
legislative purpose ... which makes the color of a person's skin the
test of whether his conduct is a criminal offense.' '291
The Chief Justice was certain of the Court's recent history in civil
rights cases. "We have consistently denied the constitutionality of
284. Id. at 9.
285. Id. at 8.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 9.
289. Id. at 11. Indeed, the statute's original purpose held no interest for the court; the Chief
Justice declared that "we find the racial classifications in these statutes repugnant to the Four-
teenth Amendment, even assuming an even-handed state purpose to protect the 'integrity' of all
races." Id. at 12 n.11.
290. Id. at 10.




measures which restrict the rights of citizens on account of race.
There can be no doubt that restricting the freedom to marry solely
because of racial classifications violates the central meaning of the
Equal Protection Clause.
'292
As for the Due Process Clause, the Chief Justice noted that
the freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital
personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free
men.
o deny this fundamental freedom on so unsupportable a basis as
the racial classifications embodied in these statutes, classifications
so directly subversive of the principle of equality at the heart of the
Fourteenth Amendment, is surely to deprive all the State's citizens
of liberty without due process of law. The Fourteenth Amendment
requires that the freedom of choice to marry not be restricted by
invidious racial discriminations. Under our Constitution, the free-
dom to marry, or not marry, a person of another race resides with
the individual and cannot be infringed by the State.293
Chief Justice Warren's final sentence put an end to the Lovings' odys-
sey. "These convictions must be reversed." 294
Richard and Mildred Loving had won the case, ten days after
their ninth wedding anniversary. From their farm home in Bowling
Green, near Fredericksburg, Mr. and Mrs. Loving drove north to Al-
exandria for a news conference at the office of their lawyers. There he
said, "We're just really overjoyed." And she remarked, "I feel free
now." A photographer snapped a picture of two happy people sitting
close together, his arm around her neck, law books in the background.
"My wife and I plan to go ahead and build a new house now," said
Richard Loving, the construction worker, about the permanent new
home in Virginia that Richard Loving the husband and father wanted
his family to live in.295
XIII. POSTSCRIPT IN VIRGINIA
The major white newspapers in Virginia greeted the Supreme
Court's ruling with equanimity; black newspapers met it with congrat-
292. Id. at 11-12.
293. Id. at 12.
294. Id.; Justices Upset All Bans on Interracial Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 1967, at 1, 28;
Charles McDowell, Jr., Miscegenation Ban Is Ended by High Court, RICHMOND TIMEs-DIs-
PATCH, June 13, 1967, at 1, 4.
295. State Couple 'Overjoyed' By Ruling, RICHMOND TIMEs-DISPATCH, June 13, 1967, at BI;
Mrs. Loving: 'I Feel Free Now', RICHMOND AFRO AMERICAN, June 17, 1967, at 1-2; see also
Simeon Booker, The Couple That Rocked Courts, EBoNY, Sept. 1967, at 78-94.
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ulations.296 Norfolk's two papers, the white Virginian-Pilot and the
black Journal and Guide, illustrate the responses. The Virginian Pilot
published an editorial, "A Unanimous Court," stating that "Antimis-
cegenation laws go back three centuries. In the beginning, their pur-
pose was to force mulattoes into the slave system, not to prevent what
white-supremacists now call 'race-mongrelization."' One might note,
of course, that the seventeenth-century laws were in fact designed to
achieve both objectives. The paper prophesied that "[s]ocial discour-
agements to mixed marriages ... will not quickly disappear," but it
also suggested that "Virginia in recent years had allowed... its law to
lose vitality." Only black-white couples like the Lovings were chal-
lenged in court, though "the restriction [the Lovings] defied applied
also to whites and members of brown and yellow races, including Chi-
nese and Filipinos. But Virginia was inclined to arrest only whites and
Negroes, although it withheld such marital civil rights as adoption, in-
heritance, and divorce from other racially mixed couples as well." In
that way the paper hinted at the relief that any number of military
families in the Norfolk area must have felt at the news. The editorial
concluded with a celebration of sorts that the topic of interracial mar-
riage had now "been removed, as it had to be, from the field of
jurisprudence."297
The Journal and Guide led off its front page with the headline
"Top Court Junks Marriage Bars"298 and printed an editorial on
"Freedom of Choice at the Altar." That paper also predicted "no no-
ticeable increase in the number of mixed marriages in Virginia," but it
rephrased the explanation. "Prospective grooms" would continue to
enjoy "the privileges of withholding their requests for the bride's
hand," it said, and brides would retain "the privilege and the authority
to prevent mixed marriages simply by saying 'no."' Nonetheless, the
Journal and Guide insisted on the importance of the court's ruling:
What makes this Supreme Court decision so desirable is that it lifts
an onerous and brutalizing stigma from Negro Virginians by knock-
296. One reason for the relative equanimity could be that the white segment of Virginia's
population had reached 81% at about the time of the Loving decision; this was the highest
percentage since the middle years of the colonial era. According to census figures, by 1970
Virginia and Alabama's nonwhite population had dropped to 18.5% and 26.4% respectively.
The African-American percentage in Virginia held steady at just under 19% in the years ahead,
while the white percentage dropped again into the high 70s as residents of Asian ancestry in-
creased to 4% by 1990. Peter Wallenstein, Cartograms and the Mapping of Virginia History,
1790-1990, 28 VA. Soc. Sci. REV. 103, 106, 110 (1993); THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOUT1ERN His-
TORY, supra note 22, at 31, 1295.
297. A Unanimous Court, VIRGINIAN PILOT, June 13, 1967, at 14.
298. Top Court Junks Marriage Bars, J. & GUIDE, June 17, 1967, at 1.
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ing down that psychological barrier which, in effect, told them and
the world that no Negro is good enough to be the husband or wife
of a white Virginian.2 9
The Journal and Guide saluted the Lovings. "They have done an in-
calculably great service for their community, their state, and their na-
tion. Had they been less persevering, the legal battle to end Virginia's
oppression on the marital front might have been forfeited long
ago.,,30o
When Virginia newspapers reported the news in the year or so
after the Loving decision, that news sometimes included prominent
items regarding interracial marriages. In September 1967, for exam-
ple, the Richmond Times-Dispatch offered a page-one story headlined
"Miss Rusk Weds Negro." In California, Margaret Elizabeth Rusk,
daughter of Secretary of State Dean Rusk, had married Guy Gibson
Smith.30 1 In June 1968, the Richmond News Leader informed Virgini-
ans about "Mixed Couple Ends Honeymoon." In Massachusetts,
Donald Hasler, a white man, had married Remi Brooke, the mixed-
race daughter of Edward W. Brooke, a U.S. Senator from
Massachusetts. 302
Even before either of those two weddings took place, Virginians
were informed that "Caucasian, Negro Wed in Norfolk." Leona Eve
Boyd was white; Romans Howard Johnson was black. In a ceremony
at Kingdom Hall Church, "a Negro Jehovah's Witnesses church," they
became "the first known partners to an interracial marriage in Vir-
ginia" since the Loving decision was handed down a month before.30 3
Authorities contested neither the "forms" nor the "essentials" of their
marriage. Thanks to the Lovings' persistence and the decision of the
U.S. Supreme Court, the Johnsons had no need to travel from their
hometown of Norfolk to Washington, D.C., to get married. And they
did not have to face the prospect of midnight arrest, felony conviction,
or longterm exile. The Lovings, their lawyers, and a federal court de-
cision had forced a change in public policy in Virginia such that the
Johnsons' decision, like that of the Lovings, was now a private matter.
The following summer, on July 14, 1968, another interracial mar-
riage took place in Virginia, as Peter Edelman married Marian E.
Wright. Wright, friend of the Reverend William Sloan Coffin, Jr., and
299. Freedom of Choice at the Altar, J. & GUIDE, June 17, 1967, at 6.
300. Id.
301. Miss Rusk Weds Negro, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Sept. 22, 1967, at 1. For analysis
of responses at the time, see Kitchen, supra note 3, at 140-44.
302. Mixed Couple Ends Honeymoon, RICHMOND NEws LEADER, June 24, 1968, at 2.
303. Caucasion, Negro Wed in Norfolk, RICHMOND TIMEs-DISPATCH, Aug. 13, 1967, at B2.
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aid to the Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., was the first black
woman to be admitted to the Mississippi bar. Edelman, a white law-
yer, had served as law clerk to Supreme Court Justices Felix Frank-
furter and Arthur J. Goldberg, as special assistant at the Justice
Department, and as legislative researcher and speechwriter in Robert
F. Kennedy's campaign for a U.S. Senate seat from New York. Rever-
end Coffin performed the ceremony, and Justice Goldberg spoke as
well. 30 4 Though a bittersweet time for all who attended-King and
Kennedy had been assassinated only weeks before-a more graphic
demonstration of how much had changed in Virginia law could hardly
be imagined.
Whether interracial marriages appeared numerous depended on
how one gauged such matters. In 1971, for example, 52,158 marriages
took place in Virginia, and of them 368, or seven per thousand, were
interracial. Of the interracial marriages, 139 were between a black
partner and a white one-48 in which the man was white and the wo-
man black, 91 where the man was black and the woman white.30 5
XIV. POSTSCRIPr IN ALABAMA
By contrast to the Virginia aftermath, authorities in Alabama
demonstrated that legal challenges to interracial marriages might not
yet be over in the South. At the time of the Lovings' victory, their
lawyer Philip J. Hirschkop had characterized the Court's decision as
broad enough to reach "all such laws in other states. ' 30 6 Nonetheless,
on November 10, 1970, Army Sergeant Louis Voyer, a 21-year-old
Vietnam veteran and Massachusetts native, went with Phyllis Bett, his
Alabama-born 17-year-old fiancee, before Probate Judge G. Clyde
Brittain of Calhoun County, Alabama, to obtain a marriage license.
Judge Brittain balked. The couple claimed that he refused on the
grounds that Alabama law prohibited the issuance of a marriage li-
cense when one party was white, as was Sergeant Voyer, and the other
black, as was Miss Bett. Alabama law still made it a felony for them
to marry and a misdemeanor for any judge to issue a license in such a
situation.30 7 The judge, declining to take his chances with an indict-
304. Nan Robertson, Aides to Robert Kennedy and Dr. King are Married in Virginia Cere-
mony, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 1968, at 23.
305. Interracial Weddings Total 386 Since '67, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Mar. 2, 1973, at
B1.
306. State Couple 'Overjoyed' By Ruling, supra note 295, at B1.
307. Alabama Marriage Law Contested, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Dec. 4, 1970, at A13;
Alabama Marriage Law Ruled Unconstitutional, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH Dec. 9, 1970, at
A8. For a brief survey of official responses in the South see SICKELS, supra note 244, at 111-15.
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ment for issuing a marriage license, ended up in court for his failure to
issue one.
In the interests of American military policy, the Nixon adminis-
tration sued the state of Alabama and Judge Brittain. Three and a
half years after the Loving decision had been handed down, U.S. At-
torney General John N. Mitchell sought to have those Alabama stat-
utes, as well as the provision of the state constitution outlawing
interracial marriages, declared void in light of Loving v. Virginia and
to enjoin the judge and the state from enforcing such laws. A deputy
assistant attorney general of Alabama, John Bookout, claimed that he
considered the Alabama laws still valid regardless of Loving. "When
the U.S. Supreme Court rules in a case," he declared, "it is binding on
people in that particular case. The Alabama law is still law until it is
stricken down. They don't just wipe these laws off the book all over
the United States because of one ruling. ' '3°8
U.S. District Judge Sam C. Pointer obliged both sides by striking
down the Alabama laws. He also gave short shrift to a motion filed by
that state to dismiss the case on the grounds that the couple had al-
ready gone to Clarksville, Tennessee, to get married. Otherwise, after
all, they would still be liable to criminal prosecution when they re-
turned to live as husband and wife in Alabama so that Sergeant Voyer
could fulfill his military obligations at Fort McClellan. 30 9
Shortly before Louis Voyer and Phyllis Bett sought a court order
so that they could be legally married in Alabama, Johnny L. Ford and
Frances Baldwin Rainer had succeeded without challenge. Before
that, for a time, the thought troubled Ford: "Oh, man-a mixed mar-
riage in the South? In the Alabama Black Belt? I got to be crazy. ' '310
But then he and she decided to go ahead. Thus, in September 1972,
when Ford was elected the first black mayor of the town of Tuskegee,
his white wife and their infant son joined in the celebration. 31'
XV. THE LAW OF SLAVERY AND THE LAW OF FREEDOM
In much of the nation, particularly in the South, Jim Crow-and
his power to govern who might marry whom-lived on in full force
308. Alabama Marriage Law Contested, supra note 307, at A13.
309. Id.; Alabama Marriage Law Ruled Unconstitutional, supra note 307, at A8; United
States v. Brittain, 319 F. Supp. 1058, 1061 (N.D. Ala. 1970).
310. Marshall Frady, An Alabama Marriage, in SOUTHERNERS: A JOURNALIST'S ODYSSEY
261, 268 (1980).
311. Id.; ROBERT J. NORRELL, REAPING THE WHIRLWIND: THE CIVIL RiOHTS MOVEMENT IN
TUSKEGEE 201 (1985).
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from the first dawn of freedom, in the aftermath of slavery, until well
into the decade of the 1960s and the "Second Reconstruction." Only
then, in the area of marriage and family relations, did it become
true-as Justice Stewart had twice insisted that it ought to be-that
"the criminality of an act" could not "depend upon the race of the
actor. '312 Only then could it no longer require an exercise in geneal-
ogy to scrutinize whether two people fell into the proper racial classifi-
cations so that they might legally marry in any American state.
Reporting on the 1967 decision in the Loving case, the New York
Times noted its larger significance. "In writing the opinion that struck
down the last group of segregation laws to remain standing-those
requiring separation of the races in marriage-Chief Justice Warren
completed the process that he set in motion with his opinion in 1954
that declared segregation in public schools to be unconstitutional. '313
Bernard S. Cohen, the Lovings' lawyer through their long quest, of-
fered a similar benediction on the proceedings. At his clients' press
conference, speaking for the Lovings, Hirschkop, and himself, he said:
"We hope we have put to rest the last vestiges of racial discrimination
that were supported by the law in Virginia and all over the
country. '3
14
Various forces at work in the 1950s and 1960s help explain why,
among all Jim Crow legislation, miscegenation laws were the last to
fall to the constitutional revolution of the modern civil rights era. A
half century ago, Gunnar Myrdal observed that in ranking the major
issues in black-white relations and the law-including schools, jobs,
and voting-white southerners most strongly resisted the idea of in-
terracial sex and marriage, but African Americans ranked the ques-
tion dead last in importance.315 All the more reason for blacks not to
squander their resources and jeopardize their prospects in a futile
quest. Individuals like Jackson and Naim, to be sure, might consider
the question of highest priority, but the state courts in the South were
least likely to reconsider that one, and the U.S. Supreme Court, as we
have seen, felt no urgency about confronting the issue either.
For reasons connected with Myrdal's analysis, the National Asso-
ciation for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) declined to
involve itself in litigating the constitutional status of antimiscegena-
312. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 13 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring); McLaughlin v. Flor-
ida, 379 U.S. 184, 198 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
313. Justices Upset All Bans on Interracial Marriage, N.Y. TIMES June 13, 1967, at 1, 28.
314. Burden Lifted by Decision, NORFOLK VIRGINIAN-PILOT, June 13, 1967, at 4.
315. MYRDAL ET AL., supra note 4, at 60-62.
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tion statutes before the 1960s. 316 The American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU), which normally focused on civil liberties questions (matters
of freedom of religious or political expression), typically played only a
supporting role in civil rights litigation. On the matter of miscegena-
tion, however, the ACLU went out ahead of the NAACP. The two
groups switched assignments, with the ACLU playing the lead role.317
Congress, for its part, had surely grown less sympathetic to an-
timiscegenation statutes by the 1960s than at any earlier time, includ-
ing Reconstruction. In almost every state outside the former
Confederacy, state action had already eliminated antimiscegenation
laws by the time the Loving case arrived at the Supreme Court. 318
But the 1964 Civil Rights Act had failed to address the matter.319 In
the 1960s, only the U.S. Supreme Court could take on the issue. In
contrast to the Court's approach a decade earlier, when it had ducked
the Jackson and Naim cases, it proved ready to address the one major
area in which Jim Crow legislation lived on.320 More than a decade
after the decisions in Brown v. Board of Education, the Court did
what it had avoided in the 1950s. It decided to deal with the Virginia
statutes and to do so in a broad rather than narrow manner. The
Chief Justice, no doubt remembering with more clarity than comfort
the Court's wish to hide from the matter early on in his tenure, stated
316. Regarding such concerns in the early 1950s, see also JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN
THE COURTS: How A DEDICATED BAND OF LAWYERS FOUGHT FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS
REVOLUTION 102 (1994). Early in the twentieth century, it is true, the organization had worked
diligently in legislative bodies to prevent the expansion of Jim Crow statutes regarding marriage.
Martyn, supra note 3, at 1068-78. "The NAACP and its allies had succeeded in every anti-misce-
genation free jurisdiction in preventing the passage of the intermarriage legislation introduced in
the 1914-1929 period." Id. at 1078. But a program of litigation against statutes deep in enemy
territory was another matter. See Sohn, supra note 213, at 129-30, 133-34. For the NAACP's
involvement in the antimiscegenation campaign beginning with McLaughlin and continuing
through Loving, see id. at 137-39.
317. Sohn, supra note 213, at 126-39. For a detailed history of the ACLU, see SAMUEL
WALKER, IN DEFENSE OF AMERICAN LIBERTIES: A HISTORY OF THE ACLU 261-78 (1990).
Chapter 12 focuses on "The Civil Rights Revolution," but nowhere does Walker discuss the
antimiscegenation crusade or the Loving case; a single sentence mentions the ACLU's successful
suit in state court against the California antimiscegenation statute contested in Perez v. Sharp, 32
Cal. 2d. 711 (1948). WALKER, supra, at 239.
318. At the time of the Supreme Court's decision, antimiscegenation statutes persisted in all
eleven states of the former Confederacy plus Delaware, Kentucky, Missouri, Oklahoma, and
West Virginia. Maryland had repealed its statute earlier in 1967. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1,
6 n.5 (1967). Thus, the states that held out through 1966 included all the slave states of 1860 plus
Oklahoma and West Virginia.
319. CHARLES WHALEN & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT (1985); ROBERT D. LOEVY, To END ALL SEGREGA-
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race and education, see ROBERT A. BURT, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONFLICT 271-310 (1992).
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the history correctly in his opening statement, "This case presents a
constitutional question never addressed by this Court."321
By the middle of 1967, one hundred years after Congress had di-
rected Alabama and Virginia to ratify the Fourteenth Amendment,
the twentieth-century case against Jim Crow had been initiated, ar-
gued, and won. The law of race and slavery, dating in Virginia from
the seventeenth century, had given way to a new law of freedom, and
the Lovings could return home and live together in Virginia. As a
consequence of the decision in the Lovings' case, the Voyers could live
together legally in Alabama. The Lovings' banishment under Virginia
law came to an end when the U.S. Supreme Court decreed that, even
with regard to marriage, Jim Crow-America's Apartheid-be ban-
ished from American law.
321. Loving, 388 U.S. at 2.
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